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CHINA'S WTO ACCESSION: ECONOMIC, 
LEGAL, AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
KAREN HALVERSON* 
Abstract: This Article discusses the unparalleled economic, legal, and 
political change that has confronted China during WfO accession. The 
Article focuses on the relationship between China's unique WfO 
accession process and China's reform over the past two decades. The 
author suggests that WfO accession has acted as a lever for economic 
and legal reform by locking in reform and making it irrevocable. The 
Article begins with a historical background of China's long road to 
accession and the way that this process worked to further the previously 
instated economic reform program. Next, the Article analyzes the 
manner in which wro accession has initiated profound legal reform. 
The final section of the Article discusses the effects of adhering to 
WfO-related obligations on the future of political reform and suggests 
that the resulting weakened control of the Communist Party may 
ultimately lead either to continued growth and political liberalization or 
to mass unrest and a backlash of government repression. 
INTRODUCTION 
As one of the newest members of the World Trade Organization 
(WT0),1 China is unique in a number of respects. First, it is by far the 
largest economic power among developing country members. By tra-
ditional measures, China fits well within the definition of a developing 
country-in most regions of the country, per capita GDP remains be-
* © 2004, Karen Halverson, Associate Professor, John Marshall Law School; J.D., Harvard 
Law School (1990) (7halvers@jmls.edu). This Article grew out of a paper that was presented 
at a conference of the International Economic Law Group of the American Society of Inter-
national Law at Georgetown University Law Center (October 2002). I thank the participants 
of the conference who offered comments on the paper, along with my able research assis-
tants, Erik Johansen, Carrie Byrnes, and Xin Gu. This Article also draws on the insights of 
Chinese officials and scholars I have encountered at John Marshall and at the University of 
Dlinois-Chicago, where I teach a course on China's WTO accession. 
I China became a member of the wro effective December 11, 2001. Taiwan's acces-
sion became effective in January 2002. The Former \Ugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FY-
ROM) is the newest WTO member; its accession became effective in April 2003. A current 
list of WTO members is available at http:/ /www.wto.org (last visited Apr. 22, 2004) [here-
inafter WTO Website]. 
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low $1000.2 Indeed, during its negotiations for accession to the WTO, 
China argued that it should be entitled to the special and differential 
treatment extended to developing countries in the wro agreements.3 
At the same time, China stands apart from other developing countries 
as a producer of, and a magnet for, foreign investment. According to 
recent WTO data, China was the seventh largest merchandise ex-
porter in the world, with aggregate exports of$249 billion in 2000.4 In 
addition, China received an estimated $46.8 billion in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in 2001, making it one of the world's largest recipi-
ents of foreign investment-second only to the United States if FDI 
flows to Hong Kong are included.5 Thus, China is both a developing 
country and an economic powerhouse. 
China is also unique in a second respect; it is the only major 
WTO member that is still Communist.6 In 1982, six years after the end 
of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
adopted a new Constitution reflecting Deng Xiaoping's ideas for 
2 Of China's thirty-one provinces, only ten reported per capita GDP above USD $1000, 
according to data from 2000. The province with the highest GDP was Guangdong 
($11,636) and the lowest was Guizhou ($299). CHINA DEVELOPMENT BRIEF, 250 CHINESE 
NGOs: CIVIL SociE1Y IN THE MAKING 127, 149 (2001) (based on data drawn from State Sta-
tistical Bureau, 2000 China Statistical Yearbook) (on file with author). 
5 See, e.g., WTO Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the Working Party on 
the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001), para. 171, http://www.uschina. 
org/workingpartyreport.doc (addressing China's ability to benefit from certain rules un-
der the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures that are available to 
developing countries) [hereinafter Working Party Report]; see also Frederick M. Abbott, 
Reflection Paper on China in the World Trading System: Defining the Principles of Engagement, in 
CHINA IN THE WORLD 'TRADING SYSTEM: DEFINING THE PRINCIPLES OF ENGAGEMENT 26-28 
(Frederick M. Abbott ed., 1998) (describing how, during accession negotiations with the 
WTO Working Party, China insisted on being considered a "developing country" member 
oftheWTO). 
4 The figure for China's exports does not include exports from Hong Kong, which to-
taled $202.4 billion in 2000 (of which only $23.7 billion constituted domestic exports and 
$178.8 billion re-exports). Press Release, World Trade Organization, World Trade Slows 
Sharply in 2001 Amid the Uncertain International Situation, tbl. 1.5 (Oct. 19, 2001), at 
http:/ /www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr249_e.htm. 
5 According to the 2002 UNCTAD World Investment Report, China and Hong Kong to-
gether received an estimated $69.7 billion in FDI in 2001. The United States was the world's 
largest recipient in 2001, with aggregate FDI of $124.4 billion. The FDI received by China 
and Hong Kong amounts to over two thirds of FDI inflows to Asia and the Pacific during the 
same period ($102.3 billion), and well over twice the amount ofFDI invested in Central and 
Eastern Europe ($27.2 billion). U.N. CoNFERENCE ON 'TRADE & DEv., WoRLD INVESTMENT 
REPORT 2002, at 303-06, UNCTAD/WIR/2002 & Corrigendum (2002), http:/ /www.unctad. 
org/ en/ docs/ /wir2002_en.pdf. 
s The only other Communist member of the WTO is Cuba. See infra note 83 (describ-
ing Cuba). 
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modernization and market reform.7 Since that time, China's reform 
effort has continued at an extraordinary pace, as the Party has in-
creasingly staked its legitimacy on China's ability to sustain high levels 
of economic growth. As a result of Deng Xiaoping's reforms, China 
has largely transformed its economy. However, it remains under the 
control of a Communist apparatus that struggles to maintain domi-
nance even as it embraces modernization. Jiang Zemin 's "three repre-
sents" campaign, which emphasizes the CCP's role in representing the 
interests of capitalists along with the interests of workers and peasants, 
is part of an ongoing effort by the Party to reform and revive itself. 8 
The CCP has opened its membership to entrepreneurs and may soon 
appoint several prominent businessmen to high positions within the 
Party.9 Currently, China is undergoing its first peaceful change of 
leadership in decades, as Jiang Zemin and other top CCP officials step 
down and cede control to a new generation of leaders.10 China is 
therefore at a turning point, both in terms of the transfer of power 
within the CCP and its new status as a WTO member. 
7 China's 1982 Constitution formalized a departure from Soviet-style Communism that 
began in December 1978 when Deng Xiaoping first announced China's "open door" policy. 
The 1982 Constitution emphasizes "socialist modernizations," provides a constitutional basis 
for foreign investment and its protection, and allows for the development of an "individual" 
economy alongside the socialist economy. SeeJIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAw: TowARDS AN UN-
DERSTANDING OF CHINESE LAW, ITs NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT67--69 (1999). 
s The "three represents" campaign was launched several years ago by former CCP 
General Secretary Jiang Zemin. The basic gist of the campaign is that, in order to prosper 
in the new millennium, the Communist Party must represent not only the workers' and 
the peasants' interests but also the development needs of the country's "advanced produc-
tive forces." See, e.g., Full Text of Jiang's Speech at CPC Anniversary Gathering, XINHUA NEws 
AGENCY,July 1, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File (text of Jiang Zemin's 
speech, which refers to the "Three Represent's" as the "source of strength" of the Party 
and the basis on which to build the Party into the new century); see also Erik Eckholm, 
Likely to Be a Best Seller in China: It's No Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, at A3,June 1, 2000 (describing 
the launching of the "Three Represents" campaign). 
9 Entrepreneurs who are thought to be candidates for high government or CCP posi-
tions include the chairmen of two of China's most successful companies: the Legend 
Group (maker of personal computers) and the Haier Group (home appliance manufac-
turer). See Joseph Kahn, China's Communist Party, 'to Survive,' Opens Its Doors to Capitalists, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2002, at AIO. 
1° See Elizabeth Rosenthal, In Ceremony with No Surprises, China Formally Changes Leaders, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2003 (late ed.), at A4 (reporting that Hu Jintao replaced Jiang Zemin 
as General Secretary of the CCP at the 16th CCP Congress in November 2002). At the 
annual session of the National People's Congress in March 2003, Wen Jiabao replaced Zhu 
Rongji as prime minister, Wu Bangguo replaced Li Peng as Chairman of the National Peo-
ple's Congress, and Hu Jintao took over Jiang Zemin's position as state president. Jiang 
Zemin will retain his title as chairman of the Central Military Commission. The Survivor 
Takes Over, THE EcoNOMIST, Mar. 22, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, Econ File. See 
generally Who sin Charge Now?, THE EcoNOMIST, Mar. 22, 2003, at 40. 
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The trajectory of China's reform process over the past two decades 
mirrors China's lengthy process of joining the WfO. This Article ana-
lyzes the relationship between these two processes. China's experience 
as a WfO member is unique. Perhaps in no other country has WfO 
accession had such a profound impact on economic, legal, and political 
change as in China. Notwithstanding concerns expressed in the past by 
WfO members regarding China's ability to comply with the obligations 
of WfO membership,n more current developments suggest that the 
threat to reform in China does not stem so much from any lack of 
commitment on the part of the CCP,12 but rather from the possibility 
that disaffected groups in China will ultimately destabilize the political 
system. The irony of China's situation is that the process ofWfO acces-
sion, by accelerating market reform and expanding the private sector, 
has exacerbated income inequality in the country. 
Part I of this Article describes China's accession process, high-
lights the role the WfO has played in propelling forward China's 
economic reform program, and contrasts China's experience with 
that of other Communist countries that joined the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during the 1960-70s. Part II ex-
amines the ways in which wro accession has provided an impetus to 
legal reform. Finally, Part III speculates on the extent to which 
China's WfO-related commitments will lead to political reform in the 
future. 
11 See, e.g., 146 CoNG. REc. H3036 (daily ed. May 15, 2000) (statement of Rep. Nancy 
Pelosi) (during the debate over whether to grant China Permanent Normal Trade Rela-
tions (PNTR), questioning whether the Chinese would "begin for a change, a drastic 
change, to start honoring the[ir] commitments"); see also NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRAT-
ING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 136 (2002) (noting frequent assertions during the 
PNTR debate that China had systematically failed to live up to its international trade obli-
gations); Public Citizen, Permanent Normal Trading Relations with China (PNTR), at 
http:/ /www.citizen.org/trade/issues/china/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 22, 2004) (state-
ment of Public Citizen against the granting of PNTR to China). Lardy demonstrates how, 
notwithstanding some delays and lapses in implementing some aspects of its commitments, 
the assertions of systematic noncompliance by China are not supported by the evidence. 
LARDY, supra, at 137-41. 
!2 See, e.g., U.S. 'TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S WTQ 
CoMPLIANCE 3 (2002), http:/ /www.ustr.gov/regions/china-hk-mongolia-taiwan/2002-12-
ll-China_WTO_compliance_report.PDF [hereinafter CoMPLIANCE REPORT] (concluding 
that, while concerns remain, China's leadership generally made "significant progress" in 
effecting systemic changes and in implementing its WTO commitments during its first year 
as a WTO member). 
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A. Histm-y 
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No country has endured as lengthy an accession process to the 
GATT/W'I'O as China, nor has any country acceding to the W'I'O been 
asked to take on as many concessions as the price for admission. From 
the date that China was first granted observer status to the GATT to the 
date that China finally acceded to the W'I'O, almost twenty years 
elapsed.13 Some of the extraordinary terms to which China agreed to 
be bound as a W'I'O member are described below. 
Generally speaking, the W'I'O accession process formally begins 
when a country informs the W'I'O Director-General of its desire to 
join.14 The W'I'O General Council then forms a ''working party" of 
members to examine the application.I5 Mter basic principles and poli-
cies have been resolved with the working party, individual W'I'O mem-
bers enter into bilateral negotiations with the applicant country over 
the specific undertakings that the applicant will agree to as a condition 
of W'I'O membership.I6 Upon completion of these bilateral negotia-
tions, the working party finalizes the accession terms in three docu-
ments: the working party report, the protocol of accession, and the at-
tached schedules containing the new member's specific liberalization 
u China was granted observer status in the GATT in November 1982 and became a 
member of the WfO in December 2001-nineteen years and one month later. For an 
official account of the chronology from the Chinese side, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the PRC, Bilateral Agreement on China's Entry to the WfO between China and the 
United States (Nov. 17, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter PRC Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs]. 
14 BERNARD M. HoEKMAN & MICHEL M. Kos-n;cKI, THE PoLITICAL EcoNOMY oF THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE Wf0 AND BEYOND 65 (2001). Typically, by the time a coun-
try applies for membership, the applicant has already obtained observer status. Id. Ob-
server governments to the WfO must commence accession negotiations within five years 
of becoming observers. Current observer governments include Russia, Vietnam, and Saudi 
Arabia, and a current list is available at the WfO Website, supm note 1. 
15 The applicant must then submit to the WfO a memorandum describing any aspects 
of the country's trade and economic policies that would potentially affect obligations con-
tained in the WfO agreements. This memorandum forms the basis for negotiations between 
the applicant and the working party. See World Trade Organization, Membership, Alliances 
and Bureaucracy, at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/rg3_e.trn (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2004) [hereinafter WfO Membership]. 
16 Although the negotiations are bilateral, the commitments apply to all WfO mem-
bers under the most-favored nation principle. I d. 
--------------------------------------
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commitmentsP The final accession terms are then presented to the 
WTO body for a vote. H two-thirds of the WfO's existing members vote 
in favor of accession, then the applicant may sign the protocol and join 
theWf0.18 
Since China was a founding member of the GATT,l9 its initial ap-
plication in 1986 was for "resumption" of its membership as a GATT 
Contracting Party.20 A number of complications and intervening events 
prolonged China's accession process. By spring of 1989, China and the 
United States had almost completed bilateral negotiations on the terms 
of China's membership to the GATT.21 However, the Chinese govern-
ment's crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators at Tiananmen 
Square resulted in the imposition of economic sanctions and an abrupt 
suspension of active negotiations until October 1992.22 Although China 
was a signatory to the Uruguay Round agreements, it was unable to 
conclude its accession negotiations by 1995, when the WfO entered 
into force. Thus, the GATT working party converted to a working party 
on China's accession to the WfO. Momentum on China's application 
was finally provided when the United States and China concluded a 
bilateral agreement on China's entry into the WfO in November 1999. 
This led to the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on WTO entry be-
tween China and the European Union, the passage of Permanent 
Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) legislation by the U.S. Congress,23 and 
17 China's accession terms are contained in the WfO Report of the Working Party on 
the Accession of China, supra note 3, and in World Trade Organization, Accession of the 
People's Republic of China, Wf/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001), http:/ /www.uschina.org [hereinafter 
Protocol]. 
18 wro Membership, supm note 15; see also HOEKMAN & KosTECKI, supra note 14, at 
65-66. 
19 China was an original Contracting Party to the GATT. Mter the 1949 revolution and 
the split between the Communists and the Kuomingtan (KMT), the KMT leaders withdrew 
China from the GATT. Jeffrey L. Gertler, The Process of China's Accession to the World Trade 
Organization, in CHINA IN THE WoRLD TRADING SYSTEM 65-66 (Frederick M. Abbott ed., 
1998) 
20 PRC Ministry of Foreign Mfairs, supra note 13. 
21 Gertler, supra note 19, at 6. 
22 According to the Chinese government, the bilateral talks were expected to be con-
cluded by the end of the year but were interrupted when "political disturbances" took 
place and Western countries, led by the United States, imposed sanctions. PRC Ministry of 
Foreign Mfairs, supra note 13. 
23 Thejackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2432, prohibits 
the United States from granting unconditional MFN status to any nonmarket economy 
country that denies its citizens the freedom to emigrate. Until Congress passed legislation 
granting PNTR status to China in September 2000, MFN status had to be renewed annually 
by the President and approved by Congress. See HoEKMAN & KosTEcKI, supra note 14, at 
404. Thus the granting of PNTR status for China cleared the way for the United States to 
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ultimately the WfO vote on China's accession, which occurred at the 
Doha Ministerial Meeting in November 2001. The events leading up to 
China's WfO accession are summarized in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Events Leading Up to China's wro Accession 
Year Event 
1948 GATI !{oes into effect (China is a Contractin!{ Party) 
1950 China withdraws from GATI 
1982 China !{ranted observer status in GATI 
1986 China notifies GA TI of intent to rene!{otiate terms of membership 
Hon!{ Kon!{ becomes a GATI Contractin!{ Party 
1987 Workin!{ party on China's membership to GATI established 
1989 Discussions of China's membership suspended until1992 due to government 
crackdown 
1992 Workin!{ party on Taiwan's accession established 
1994 Uru!{uay round of trade ne!{otiations completed (China is a si!{natory) 
1995 WTO enters into force; China applies for accession to WTO 
1999 United States and China si.!{n bilateral a!{reement on China's accession 
2000 U.S. Con!{ress passes PNTR le!{islation 
EU and China si.!{n bilateral a!{reement on China's accession 
2001 China's accession to WTO becomes effective (Taiwan joins shortly thereafter) 
Sources: HoEKMAN & KosTECKI, supra note 14, at 403-05; Gertler, supra note 19, at 66; PRC 
Ministry ofForei.!{n Affairs, su(Jra note 13; WTO Website, su(Jra note 1. 
There were a number of political events that disrupted relations 
between the United States and China and slowed progress on WfO 
accession talks, such as NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade in May 1999.24 However, China's application was complicated 
by other factors as well. First, as mentioned in the Introduction,25 
China's dual status as a developing country and economic power posed 
a dilemma. While China's negotiators insisted on "special and differen-
tial" developing country treatment, WfO members viewed China as a 
major source of cheap labor imports and thus a threat to domestic in-
dustry. 26 Second, WfO members were concerned with the planned na-
extend MFN treatment to China as required under Article I of GATI. For the history of 
MFN status and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, see Di Jiang Schuerger, The Most Favored 
Nation Trade Status and China: The Debate Should Stop Here, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1321, 
1324-30 (1998). 
24 Other political obstacles included the Taiwan question, U.S. concern over intellec-
tual property enforcement in China, and the U.S. tendency to link human rights issues 
with trade. See generally Joseph Fewsmith, China and the WTO: The Politics Behind the Agree-
ment, NBR ANALYSIS, Dec. 1999, at 23, available at http:/ /www.nbr.org. 
25 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. 
26 See HoEKMAN & KosTECKI, supra note 14, at 403. 
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ture of China's economy and sought evidence of sufficient market ori-
entation as a condition to membership,27 Business interests pressed for 
increased market access and commitments to promote transparency as 
a price for China's accession.28 China initially resisted many of these 
demands but shifted its stance in early 1999.29 Finally, increased sub-
stantive coverage of the Uruguay Round agreements (including intel-
lectual property protection, trade in services, and agriculture) broad-
ened the scope of commitments demanded as a price of admission. 30 
B. China's Protocol 
China's WfO obligations, in many respects, span further than 
the obligations of the WfO's existing members.31 When one takes 
into account the size of China's economy, its status as a developing 
country, and the degree to which China (until very recently) operated 
as a planned economy, the extent of China's commitments are un-
precedented.32 Summarized below are some of the more significant 
concessions that China agreed to in its protocol: 
27 Id. 
28 !d. 
29 See Fewsmith, supra note 24, at 27-28 (discussing the factors that led the Chinese 
leadership to offer substantial concessions to the United States in order to conclude a 
bilateral agreement on wro accession). 
30 See HoEKMAN & KosTECKI, supra note 14, at 67 (discussing reasons why WTO acces-
sion has become "considerably more burdensome" than it was during the GATT era). 
31 For a sector-by-sector comparison of China's commitments with those of other WTO 
members, see LARDY, supra note 11, at 69-79. China has not only agreed to comply with 
the terms of the vVTO agreements, but, as discussed below, China has agreed to a number 
of rules that "go far beyond" the rules that bind other wro members, including those 
members that joined the WTO after 1995. Id. at 80. 
32 Although the magnitude of China's commitments exceeds that of other formerly 
Communist countries who have acceded to the WTO, aspects of China's terms of acces-
sion, such as the special safeguard rule and China's designation as a "nonmarket econ-
omy" for purposes of anti-dumping determinations, have their precedent in earlier rules 
developed to address the special challenges of trade with Eastern Bloc communist coun-
tries. See infra notes 82-103. 
China is not the first country to face discriminatory treatment in its efforts to join the 
world economic community. When Japan joined the GATT in 1955, fourteen member 
countries invoked a special 'Japan article" to withhold most-favored nation treatment to 
Japanese products. See generally Philip H. Trezise, US-Japan Trade: The Bilateral Connection, in 
THE POLITICS OF TRADE: US AND jAPANESE PoLICYMAKING FOR THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS 1 
n.1 (Michael Blaker ed., 1978). During the first years of japan's membership in the GATT, 
the U.S. government bypassed GATT procedures and pressured the japanese government 
to impose "voluntary" export restraints on Japanese textile producers, which effectively 
subjected japanese exports to quotas and price controls. Jd. at 2-3. In addition, when Po-
land, Hungary, and Romania acceded to the GATT in the 1960-70s, the Contracting Par-
ties required that the protocols of accession for these countries reserve the right for the 
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• Market access in goods. China agreed to reduce tariffs on industrial 
goods to an average rate of 8.9% and to sustain this average against 
future increase. China's average tariff level on industrial goods is 
thus just a fraction of that prevailing in a number of large, devel-
oping countries, including India (32.4%), Brazil (27%), and In-
donesia (36.9%) .33 
• Market access in services. Under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), China agreed to liberalize a number of service 
sectors that were previously closed or severely restricted to foreign 
investment. China made commitments in all sectors covered by the 
GATS, including financial, telecommunications, distribution, and 
legal services. 34 
• Agriculture. China agreed to eliminate quotas on all but a few agri-
cultural goods35 and to eliminate export subsidies on agricultural 
goods.36 The Development Research Center (part of the PRC State 
Contracting Parties to take special, country-specific safeguard action in the event that the 
acceding state's exports would cause "serious injury" to domestic producers. See K. Grzy-
bowski, Socialist Countries in GAIT, 28 AM.J. CoMP. L. 539, 549 (1980); see also M.M. Kos-
TECKI, EAST-WEST TRADE AND THE GATT SYSTEM 107 (1978) (describing the safeguard 
clause). Western European countries maintained discriminatory quantitative restrictions 
against Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian exports, and the United States refused to ex-
tend MFN treatment to Hungary and Romania, even after these countries joined the 
GATT. See KosTECKI, supra, at 98-99. 
33 LARDY, supra note 11, at 79. 
34 The extensive and detailed commitments are set forth in a fifty-five-page schedule to 
China's Working Party Report. WTO Working Party, Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China, Part IT-Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services, WT/ ACC/ 
HN/49/ Add.2 (Oct. 1, 2001), http:/ /www.uschina.org/specificcommitment.doc [hereinaf-
ter Schedule of Specific Commitments]. 
For example, China has agreed to eliminate all "non-prudential" restrictions on the 
banking sector, including ownership and operation restrictions, by December 2006. lf they 
meet the minimum asset requirements spelled out in the Schedule, foreign banks will be 
allowed to establish subsidiaries in China and will be able to engage in local currency 
transactions after three years of profitable business operation in China. !d. at 35-36; see also 
infra notes 75-81. 
35 Under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, members agreed to replace quantitative 
restrictions on agricultural goods with tariffs. HoEKMAN & KosTECKI, supra note 14, at 217. 
China agreed to replace all but a few agricultural quotas with tariffs and to utilize tariff-
rate quotas (i.e., a low tariff in effect until a specified quota of imports has been reached, 
after which time a much higher tariff becomes effective, thus functioning like a quota with 
fewer trade-distorting effects) for a list of ten commodities. See Frederick W. Crook, Betting 
the Farm: The WTO s Impact on the Agricultural Sect01; CHINA Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 2002, tbl. 1, 
http:/ /www.chinabusinessreview.com. 
36 China's commitment to reduce subsidies on agricultural exports to zero can be con-
trasted with comparable commitments of the EU (reduced export subsidies by 36%, to 
$8.496 billion), the United States (same, to $594 million), and Mexico (reduced by 26%, 
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Council) estimates that, due to the adjustments brought by phas-
ing out quotas and subsidies on agricultural goods pursuant to its 
WTO commitments, China will lose 11.3 million jobs in the agri-
cultural sector.37 
• Subsidies. By signing on to the Agreement on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) ,38 China in effect agreed to 
make subsidies to state-owned enterprises subject to countervailing 
duty actions. With limited exceptions, China agreed not to take 
advantage of the special provisions in the SCM Agreement that are 
applicable to developing countries.39 China also expressly agreed 
to eliminate export subsidies on industrial goods upon accession. 40 
• Transparency-related commitments. China specifically agreed to trans-
late into one of the wro languages and make publicly available41 
all WTO-related law, to apply such law in a uniform and neutral 
manner, and to allow judicial review of administrative decisions re-
lating to such implementation.42 China also agreed to be subject to 
annual, "transitional" reviews of its compliance with WTO-related 
obligations for eight years following accession.43 
to $553 million). INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE/COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, BUSI-
NESS GUIDE TO THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 180 (2d ed. 1999). 
37 Lardy, supra note 11, at 109-10. In other words, the number of agricultural workers 
alone that will be displaced amounts to over a third of Canada's population. 
38 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], An-
nex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) 
[hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
39 See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
40 Protocol, supra note 17, pt. I, para. 10(3). China's commitments under the SCM 
Agreement are discussed in detail in Part I.C below. 
41 See Working Party Report, supra note 3, para. 334. China's representative to the 
WTO Working Party on China's accession stated that China would make available transla-
tions "in one or more of the official languages of the WTO" (i.e., either English, French, 
or Spanish) all vVTO-related laws, regulations, and other measures. Id. 
42 See Protocol, supra note 17, pt. I, para. 2. 
43 See id. pt. I, para. 18. China's protocol provides for a "transitional review mecha-
nism," or a review by the WTO of the implementation by China of its commitments under 
the protocol and under the WTO agreements each year for eight years following accession. 
Id. This review is analogous to the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) that was in-
cluded in the Uruguay Round agreements. The purpose of the TPRM is to enhance trans-
parency and understanding of WTO member countries' trade policies and practices 
through regular monitoring. See World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Reviews, at 
http:/ /www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2004). The 
frequency of TPRM review for any given WTO member increases with the overall amount 
of that member's trade; the largest trading country, the United States, is subject to TPRM 
review every two years. Smaller countries may be reviewed every six years. Id.; see also 
HoEKMAN & KosTECKI, supra note 14, at 63. 
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• Nonmarket economy treatment in anti-dumping cases. Where a product 
that is subject to an anti-dumping investigation is exported from a 
nonmarket economy, the WfO Anti-Dumping Agreement allows 
authorities to determine the dumping margin by "constructing" 
the value of the product in the home market. 44 Under U.S. anti-
dumping practice, authorities follow the controversial approach of 
utilizing the input costs of a "surrogate" third country for purposes 
of determining the constructed value.45 Observers have severely 
China's protocol, by subjecting China to annual reviews for eight years, exceeds the 
requirements of even the largest WfO members under the TPRM. China's first transi-
tional review was conducted at the end of 2002. See WfO Council for Trade in Goods, &-
port of the Council for Trade in Goods on China's Transitional Review, G/L/596 (Dec. 3, 2002); 
WfO Council for Trade in Services, Transitional Review Under Section 18 of the Protocol on the 
Accession of the People's &public of China, S/C/15 (Nov. 8, 2002); WfO Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of futellectual Property Rights, Transitional Review Under Section 18 of the 
Protocol on the Accession of the People's &public of China, IP /C/26 (Dec. 3, 2002). These re-
ports are available online at http:/ /docsonline.wto.org. 
44 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2.2, wro Agreement, supra note 38, Annex 1A, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter 
Anti-Dumping Agreement]. The anti-dumping margin of a given product is normally de-
termined by comparing the price charged for the product in the home market of the ex-
porting country with the price charged for the product upon export. !d. Article 2.2 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that when, due to the particular domestic market situa-
tion of the exporting country, the price charged at home "do[es] not permit a proper 
comparison," a constructed value may be determined. fu determining constructed value, 
authorities calculate the home market value of the product by adding production costs to 
a reasonable amount for administrative costs, marketing costs, and profits. Id. Such costs 
and profits may be determined on the basis of actual records kept by the producer under 
investigation, or, where that is not possible, on the basis of: (i) actual costs and profits in-
curred by producers in the same domestic market of products in the same general cate-
gory; (ii) a weighted average of costs and profits incurred by producers under investiga-
tion in the same domestic market of like products; or (iii) "any other reasonable method." 
!d. 
45 John H. Jackson, State Trading and Nonrnarket Economies, 23 INT'L LAWYER 891, 905 
(1989). Professor John Jackson describes the "surrogate country" method of constructing 
value under U.S. anti-dumping law: 
In a case involving alleged dumping from a nonmarket economy, the U.S. 
authorities would examine the product in the nonmarket economy and estab-
lish all the various input components (parts, labor, overheads, etc.). Then the 
U.S. authorities would seek a "surrogate country," which would be a market ori-
ented country at approximately the same level of economic development as the 
allegedly dumping nonmarket economy. The U.S. authorities would then take 
the list of inputs, a sort of "shopping list," to the surrogate country, and price 
each of those inputs on the market of the surrogate country. With this informa-
tion it would then compile an overall constructed cost, and by adding the statu-
torily mandated amounts for administration and profit (the latter being 8 per-
cent), the U.S. authorities would find the "home market price .... " 
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!d. 
criticized this approach as arbitrary and discriminatory towards 
nonmarket economies.46 In particular, China has long argued that 
it should not be treated as a "nonmarket economy" in light of the 
market orientation of its economy after years of reform.47 Notwith-
standing its position on this issue, China agreed in its protocol of 
accession to be treated as a "nonmarket economy" for fifteen years 
after accession for purposes of conducting anti-dumping investiga-
tions against Chinese companies. 48 
• Disaiminatmy safeguard rule. The WfO Safeguards Agreement se-
verely restricts the ability of members to impose "safeguards" or 
otherwise WfO-inconsistent quotas and tariffs temporarily im-
posed in exceptional circumstances. 49 China agreed to allow WfO 
46 See, e.g., William P. Alford, When is China Paraguay 1 An Examination of the Application 
of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other "Non-
market Economy" Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 79, 89 (1987) (criticizing the "surrogate coun-
try" approach and listing the countries-including Paraguay, Thailand, the Dominican 
Republic, and Pakistan-that the U.S. Commerce Department has used as China's surro-
gate in calculating dumping margins). 
47 See Alford, supra note 46, at 86 (describing how, in 1980, counsel for China argued 
during an anti-dumping investigation that the menthol industry in China operated under 
market conditions); China Blasts U.S. over Trade Obstacles, Kvono NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 17, 
1995, available at LEXIS, News Library,Jen File (describing Chinese foreign trade minister 
Wu Vi's critique of U.S. anti-dumping investigations against Chinese producers, in particu-
lar its treatment of the Chinese market as a "nonmarket economy"); Bruce Stokes, Trade 
Moves China Off the Sidelines, THE NAT'LJ., May 2, 1987, at 1080, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, Ntljnl File (stating that the Chinese "want the opportunity to prove" to the United 
States that Chinese producers operate under market conditions for purposes of dumping 
determinations). 
The argument that China is predominantly a market economy (at least for the pur-
pose of setting prices) is supported by recent data: as of 1999, the prices of 95% of retail 
commodities, 86% of producer goods, and 83% of agricultural commodities in China were 
determined by market forces (as opposed to state-guided or state-fixed prices). LARDY, 
supra note 11, at 25 (relying on Chinese, IMF, and WTO data). 
48 See Protocol, supra note 17, pt. I, para. 15. The protocol permits a WTO member to 
use a "methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs 
in China." !d. In other words, the investigating agency may compare the export price of 
the good in question with either a "constructed price" or a "surrogate," third-country price 
to approximate the Chinese home market price. Id. As Nicholas Lardy argues, this meth-
odology disadvantages China in a number of ways-for example, by using a surrogate 
country that has higher labor costs than China, or by including a profit margin in con-
structed value calculations. See LARDY, supra note 11, at 87-88. 
49 See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 38, Annex 
1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [here-
inafter Safeguards Agreement]. For example, before resorting to safeguards, a country 
must show "serious injury" to domestic industry, id. art. 2(1), and must apply the safeguard 
in a nondiscriminatory manner (with some exceptions), id. art. 2(2). The Agreement also 
includes a 4-year sunset clause, which can be extended to 8 years. Id. art. 7. 
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members to apply a special safeguard rule, the "transitional prod-
uct-specific safeguard" (TPSS) that applies only to China and will 
remain in effect for twelve years after accession. 5° The TPSS allows 
other WTO members to impose quotas and tariffs on Chinese 
goods upon a minimal showing of injury, and it restricts China's 
ability to retaliate.51 
The Chinese tend to be senstttve to foreign interference in do-
mestic affairs and attach a great deal of importance to reciprocity and 
mutual benefit in trade relations with the West. 52 To some degree, this 
50 See Protocol, supra note 17, pt. I, para. 16. 
51 Id. Specifically, the TPSS may be imposed upon a showing of "market disruption" to 
domestic industry, may target only Chinese goods, and has no sunset clause. Id. Also, in 
contrast with the WTO Safeguards Agreement, which allows the target country to immedi-
ately retaliate when a safeguard has been imposed in response to a relative increase in 
imports, see Safeguards Agreement, supra note 49, art. 8, China may not retaliate under 
the TPSS until the safeguard has been in place for two years. Safeguards Agreement, supra 
note 49, art. 8. 
The language of the TPSS in some respects tracks that of Section 406 of the U.S. 
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1974) ("Section 406"), a special safeguard provision 
under U.S. law that applies only to communist countries. See also John P. Erlick, Relief from 
Imports from Communist Countries: The Trials and Tribulations of Section 406, 13 LAW & PoL'Y 
INT'L Bus. 617, 618-20 (1981);Jackson, supra note 45, at 902. Section 406 authorizes the 
President to impose quotas or tariffs on imports originating in a Communist country 
(defined as any country "dominated or controlled" by Communism) if, after investigation, 
U.S. authorities find evidence of "market disruption" to domestic industry. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2436(c). Section 406 defines market disruption to occur when imports "are increasing 
rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a significant cause of material injury, or 
threat thereof, to domestic industry." 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e) (2) (A). Identical language is 
found in the TPSS. 
As of September 2002, at least one country had invoked the TPSS. See Committee on 
Safeguards, Transitional Product Specific Safeguard on Imports of Industrial Sewing Machine Nee-
dles into India from the People's Republic of China, G/SG/54 (Sept. 18, 2002). 
India submitted a notification to the WTO Committee on Safeguards, requesting con-
sultations with China under the TPSS and notifying the committee of an application for 
imposition of a safeguard duty on imports of industrial sewing machine needles. I d.; see also 
LARD¥, supm note 11, at 81-86 (noting that China also agreed to a special textile safeguard 
but predicting that the TPSS will be utilized instead, due to the absence of a sunset clause 
for the TPSS and the fact that the textile safeguard only lasts 7 years as opposed to 12). 
The terms of the textile safeguard are set forth in the Working Party Report, supra note 3, 
para. 238. 
52 Fewsmith, supra note 24, at 23 (noting that China's sensitivity to foreign pressure 
and unequal treatment can be illustrated by an incident that occurred during the spring of 
1999-an incident which, combined with the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 
Belgrade, threatened to derail the WTO accession negotiations between the United States 
and China). Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited the United States in April 1999 with the 
expectation of reaching agreement with the United States on the terms of China's acces-
sion. Id. at 24. On behalf of the Chinese leadership, Zhu offered numerous concessions 
that the United States had long been demanding as a condition to supporting China's bid. 
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can be attributed to a history of humiliating and discriminatory 
treatment that China suffered at the hands of Britain, France, and the 
United States at the turn of the century.53 Viewed from this perspec-
tive, one wonders why the Chinese leadership agreed to WfO acces-
sion terms that, among other things, ( 1) require it to make broad and 
deep market access commitments across goods and services sectors; 
(2) bind China to Western norms of transparency, procedural fair-
ness, and intellectual property protection; and (3) (with respect to 
the "nonmarket economy" treatment and the TPSS) single out China 
for less than most-favored nation (MFN) treatment. 
There are obvious reasons why China would view WfO member-
ship as beneficial. China stands to benefit from the recognition and 
prestige that wro membership brings. wro membership will deepen 
China's integration into the world economy and signal its status as a 
world economic power. 54 Conversely, the costs of remaining outside of 
the wro may well exceed the costs ofjoining.55 
!d. After President Clinton declined to conclude a deal, the office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR) made matters worse by posting details of China's concessions on its web-
site. !d. at 30. The Chinese reaction to the posting was immediate, vociferous, and hostile. 
!d. The posting not only was viewed as a heavy-handed move on the part of the United 
States, but once the public had access to the substance of the concessions, the public ac-
cused Zhu of "selling out the country" to the United States. !d. at 31. Although China's 
leaders ultimately decided to resume negotiations, the incident permanently damaged 
Zhu Rongji's status within the leadership and in the eyes of the public. !d. at 34. Articles 
posted on the Internet labeled Zhu a "traitor," and Zhu's concessions to the United States 
were analogized to infamous demands japan imposed on China in 1915. !d. at 31. 
53 See Di Jiang-Schuerger, The Most Favored Nation Trade Status and China: The Debate 
Should Stop Here, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1321, 1336-37. During the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, Great Britain used "opium and troops" to open the Chinese market to 
trade and forced China to cede the port of Hong Kong. The United States and France, 
along with Britain, signed "unequal" treaties with China that allowed foreign law to apply 
in areas of China and imposed other discriminatory trade terms. !d. For example, China's 
trade treaties with the United States and Britain obligated China to grant MFN treatment 
without receiving MFN treatment in return. !d. at 1336 n.93. 
54 See Fewsmith, supra note 24, at 39. 
55 LLOYD GRUBER, RuLING THE WoRLD: PowER PoLITics AND THE RISE oF SuPRANA-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONS 4 (2000). Political scientist Lloyd Gruber argues that international 
cooperation through participation in institutions such as the WTO may make certain 
countries worse off, not only relative to other member countries, but in an absolute 
sense-that is, relative to the status quo prior to joining. !d. The "loser" countries may 
nonetheless participate in light of the fact that exclusion from the institution would be 
even worse than participating, given the power of the remaining countries to "go it alone." 
!d. at 7. According to this theory, China may have had little choice but to agree to the on-
erous terms of accession imposed by the WTO Working Party, since the alternative ( exclu-
sion from the international trading regime) was simply not a viable option. !d. 
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Additionally, there are a number of theories that have been of-
fered to explain why China's leaders may have treated the issue ofWTO 
accession with some degree of urgency. First, as some Chinese specu-
late, Jiang Zemin may have wished to complete the accession process 
before ceding power to a new generation of leaders. 56 Second, China 
wished to finalize its accession prior to the round of trade negotiations 
scheduled to commence in Seattle in November 1999.57 Third and 
most significantly, the 1997 Asian financial crisis likely served as a "wake 
up" call for China, 58 signaling the need to complete its process of eco-
nomic reform. The worsening impact of the state-owned sector as a 
drag on economic growth, combined with the growing debt crisis in the 
state-owned financial sector, 59 were problems that could not be ignored 
any longer. In this respect, China's leaders may have viewed WTO ac-
cession as generating necessary momentum to complete the most po-
litically difficult stage of China's move to a market economy.60 
C. m'O as a Lever for Reform 
The essential function of the WTO has been described as provid-
ing a means to "resolve conflicts of interest within, not between, na-
tions. "61 A more vivid analogy, along these same lines, characterizes the 
wro as a "mast to which governments can tie themselves to escape the 
56 Comment based on personal conversations. 
57 See, e.g., China, US Sign Landmark Pact, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 16, 1999, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, Chidly File (stating that the commencement of the Seattle Round 
was "widely seen as the deadline" for China to join the WTO); EU's Lamy Expected to Meet 
China's Shi in Seattle, AsiAN PoLITICAL NEws, Nov. 29, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Iacnws File; William McMahon, Even As China's WTO Bid Grows Dim, Backdoor Maneu-
vers Still Possible, CHINAONLINE, Oct. 21, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Chinao 
File. China concluded its bilateral agreement with the United States, which set forth the 
most significant terms relating to China's WTO accession, on November 16, 1999,just two 
weeks prior to the Seattle meetings. The scheduled round of negotiations at Seattle was 
thwarted by widespread protests and was effectively postponed until the Doha Ministerial 
meeting in December 2001. 
58 SeeLARDY, supra note 11, at 16. 
59 See id. at 13-15. 
60 See SuPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI & MARK L. CLIFFORD, CHINA AND THE WTO: CHANG-
ING CHINA, CHANGING WoRLD TRADE 140-41(2002) (describing the decision by China's 
leaders to join the WTO as a "risky and courageous choice" that "reflects a belief that do-
mestic reform needs the external pressure of WTO entry"). Dr. Supachai is currently Di-
rector-General of the WTO. 
6! FRIEDER RoEsSLER, The Constitutional Function of the Multilateral Trade Orde1; in EssAYS 
ON THE LEGAL STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS & LIMITS OF THE WoRLD TRADE ORDER 109 
(Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Uirich eds., 2000) (emphasis added). 
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siren-like calls of various pressure groups. "62 Although these descrip-
tions were made with reference to Western political tradition, China's 
situation provides a contrasting, but equally illustrative, example. While 
not a democracy, China nonetheless must deal with its own unique 
range of groups protecting their respective vested interests. These in-
terests include central versus local governments, powerful ministry 
officials, the managers of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and 
the diversity of interests across China's various provinces, which is pro-
nounced due to the unevenness of economic growth within the coun-
try. Finally, there are divisions among different political factions within 
the CCP-some are convinced of the need to aggressively pursue mar-
ket reform, while others are more reluctant, even reactionary. 
WTO accession acts not just as a lever to force reform, but it also 
serves to lock in economic reform and make it irrevocable. In adopt-
ing the rules in China's protocol of accession, the WTO framework 
acts as a sort of constitution, imposing economic discipline by con-
straining the ability of those in China's government who might wish to 
take a different course of action. Thus, China's recent accession illus-
trates how the commitments imposed as a condition of WTO mem-
bership may provide the political leverage necessary to move difficult 
economic reforms to the next stage. In terms of imposing market dis-
cipline on the country, one could say the WTO is analogous to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) .63 
The most direct form of discipline that WTO accession brings is 
the increased competition that China's state-owned sector will face 
from opening up to foreign trade. But, as China expert Nicholas Lardy 
62 HoEKMAN & KosTECKI, supra note 14, at 29 (citing Frieder Roessler, The Scope, Limits 
and Function of the GATT Legal System, 8 WoRLD EcoN. 289-98 (1985) ). 
63 See jeffrey D. Sachs, Strengthening IMF Programs in Highly Indebted Countries, in PULLING 
TOGETIIER: ThE INTERNATIONAL MoNETARY FUND IN A MULTIPOLAR WoRLD 111 (Catherine 
Gwin & Richard E. Feinberg eds., 1989). Although IMF conditionality is a lever that pressures 
sovereign debtors, the IMF could be utilized to pressure creditors as well. Id. In an article 
published at the height of the Latin American debt crisis, Jeffrey Sachs argued in favor of 
IMF-mandated rules to force creditors to accept debt reduction (creditor agreements to re-
duce interest or principal payments on outstanding debt issued by deeply indebted sovereign 
borrowers). He reasoned that mandatory rules imposed by an international institution would 
actually work to the benefit of international banks, by shielding management from "disgrun-
tled" shareholders. Id. Sachs suggested that creditors "want debt reduction to appear un-
avoidable" and privately reject the feasibility of a voluntary approach. Id. Although the IMF 
has not adopted such an approach to date, the IMF and the World Bank are currently explor-
ing a proposal to adopt a mandatory, bankruptcy-like approach to sovereign debt problems. 
See Edmund L. Andrews, World Financial Officials Back New World Debt Framework, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 28, 2002, at A6. Professor Sachs's argument regarding the IMF's potential role is analo-
gous to the role that the WTO may play to provide leverage for economic reform in China. 
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observes, if China's state-owned banking sector continues to "channel 
disproportionate amounts of funds to inefficient state-owned compa-
nies," then the discipline provided by increased competition on China's 
domestic economy will be eroded, since the recipients of such funds 
gain an "unfair" advantage on the market.64 The brunt of the state-
owned sector's inefficiency is thereby borne by China's banks. Indeed, 
the staggering burden of non performing loans on China's banking sec-
tor is widely recognized as one of the most daunting challenges that the 
country faces in completing its transition to a market economy.65 
There are two aspects of the WTO rules that could provide lever-
age to China's government authorities in stemming the flow of funds 
64 China's reform of its state-owned sector bears some resemblance to that of certain 
Eastern European countries (such as Hungary and Thgoslavia) that underwent privatiza-
tion in the late 1980s. As discussed below, Hungarian enterprises during the 1980s oper-
ated under a "soft budget constraint." See infra note 102. 
In China's case, a source of the "soft budget constraint" on inefficient enterprises is 
generous credit terms from the state-owned banking system. See LARDY, supra note 11, at 
128-30. As Lardy describes, even after China opens up its market to foreign competition, 
money-losing firms in China may continue to finance their losses by borrowing from state 
banks. Lardy argues that the cost to China of continuing to "policy [lend]" to inefficient 
firms is very high, both in terms of increasing the financial burden on the banks as well as 
inhibiting the flow of funds to more efficient uses. Id. 
65 See Banking on Growth, THE EcoNOMIST, jan. 18, 2003, at 67. Goldman Sachs recently 
estimated that $500-600 billion, or roughly half of all loans by Chinese banks, are unlikely 
to be repaid in full. Official figures put the level of non performing loans at just over 25%. 
Jd.; see also NICHOLAS LARDY, CHINA'S UNFINISHED EcoNOMIC REVOLUTION 115-22 (1998) 
(explaining why Chinese financial reporting underestimates the magnitude of the prob-
lems that the banks face and suggesting that, collectively, China's four major banks have a 
negative net worth); Keith Bradsher, Another Asian Nation Battling a Crisis in Its Banking 
System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2002, at B1 (citing an economist's estimate that the debt bur-
den could cost China enough to retard its annual growth rate by as much as 2% in the 
next few years) [hereinafter Bradsher, Another Asian Nation]; Keith Bradsher, New Challenge 
for China's Shaky Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at C1 (close to two-thirds of senior CCP 
officials recently surveyed believe that a financial crisis poses the "greatest danger" to 
China in the near future) [hereinafter Bradsher, New Challenge]. 
In 1999, the Chinese government set up four Asset Management Companies 
(AMCs)-each linked with one of China's four main state-owned banks-in an effort to 
take some of the banks' non performing loans off of their books. See Li Ymg & Li Xin, Es-
tablishment of Financial Asset Management Companies and Related Impacts, at 
http:/ /www.ahk-china.org/ china-economy /berichte-analysen-financial-asset.htm (Mar. 10, 
2004). The AMCs may then swap the debt for equity in the borrower company or find a 
buyer for the debt. Id. By June 2002, the AMCs had cleared 210.3 billion yuan (about $25 
billion USD) of nonperforming loans from the banks' balance sheets. Id. Due in part to 
the lack of a developed capital market in China and the limitations of China's bankruptcy 
law, the work of the AMCs in disposing of the debt has proceeded very slowly. Id. As of 
October 2002, the AMCs had sold off only eleven percent of their loan portfolios and re-
ceived on average twenty-one cents for each dollar of face value of assets sold. See Bradsher, 
Another Asian Nation, supra note 65, at 27. 
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from China's banking sector to its state-owned enterprises: first, WfO 
restrictions on industrial subsidies; and second, China's commitment 
under the GATS to open its banking sector to foreign competition. 
The SCM Agreement66 discourages and, to some extent, prohibits 
China's government from providing financial support to state-owned 
enterprises. The term "subsidy" is defined broadly in the SCM Agree-
ment to include a financial benefit (such as a cash contribution, a tax 
break, or any contractual arrangement on terms more favorable than 
what the market would bear) granted by the government to an indus-
try as a means of support.67 While subsidies may further legitimate 
policy objectives of China's government in buffering its move towards 
a market economy (such as mitigating the effects of privatization on 
laid-off workers or supporting the development of new industries in 
regions that have been dominated by state-owned enterprises), the 
use of certain subsidies is either discouraged or prohibited by the 
SCM Agreement due to a distorting effect on trade. 
The general approach of the SCM Agreement is to prohibit a lim-
ited range of subsidies while allowing other subsidies to be the basis 
for imposing countervailing duties.68 Specifically, prohibited subsidies 
include those that are contingent upon export or the use of domestic 
over imported goods.69 Notwithstanding China's status as a develop-
ing country, most of the phase-out periods and other special rules ap-
plicable to developing countries under the SCM Agreement will not 
66 SCM Agreement, supra note 38. Commitments to reduce and/or eliminate subsidies 
are contained in two WTO agreements: industrial subsidies are covered in the SCM 
Agreement, and agricultural subsidies are covered in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, 
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 38, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS 
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
67 SCM Agreement, supra note 38, art. 1. The SCM Agreement defines a "subsidy" to 
include a "financial contribution" by a government that confers a "benefit" on the recipi-
ent producer. Id.; see also WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada-Measures Mfecting the 
Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/ AB/R (Aug. 20, 1999), para. 157 (explaining that a 
"benefit" may be found to have been conferred where "the recipient has received a 
'financial contribution' on terms more favorable than those available to the recipient in 
the market"). 
68 See SCM Agreement, supra note 38, arts. 2, 15. Countervailing duties are compensa-
tory tariffs that a country may levy on imports that the government determines to have 
"unfairly" benefited from subsidies. The SCM Agreement authorizes a country to levy coun-
tervailing duties on subsidized products of an exporting country if the subsidy is "specific" 
(i.e., targeted to a particular industry), and the use of such subsidy can be shown to have 
caused "material injury" to the importing country's domestic industry. Id. 
69 Id. art. 3.1. 
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apply to China. 70 In addition, China agreed in its protocol of acces-
sion to define a given subsidy as "specific," and, therefore, subject to a 
countervailing duty action, if "disproportionately" large numbers of 
state-owned enterprises receive such subsidy.71 Thus, a preferential 
loan program from a state-owned bank that disproportionately 
benefits state-owned enterprises may fall within the definition of a 
specific subsidy and, therefore, could be subject to a countervailing 
duty action on imports produced by the subsidized enterprises.72 
Thus, while only a limited category of subsidies is outright prohibited, 
a much broader range of subsidies will be actionable, which means 
among other things that they may be subject to countervailing du-
ties.73 
Whereas China's subsidy commitments impose external con-
straints on the government's ability to channel funds to state-owned 
enterprises, its commitment to open up the banking sector to foreign 
participation imposes discipline through market pressure. In other 
words, China's GATS commitments should encourage reform of the 
7o For example, developing country WTO members were exempt from the SCM 
Agreement's prohibition of certain subsidies for a transitional period of up to eight years 
after the Agreement went into effect (i.e., until 2003). See SCM Agreement, supm note 38, 
arts. 27.2, 27.3. In addition, certain benefits conferred pursuant to the privatization pro-
gram of a developing country wro member are not actionable through the imposition of 
countervailing duties. Id. art. 27.13. China agreed not to reserve the right to benefit from 
these and a number of other benefits extended to developing countries under the SCM 
Agreement. See Working Party Report, supra note 3, para. 169. 
71 Protocol, supm note 17, pt. I, para. 10. The SCM Agreement used to define a cate-
gory of "non-actionable" subsidies, such as certain research and development-related sub-
sidies. SCM Agreement, supra note 38, art. 8. These provisions expired, however, and have 
not been renewed. 
72 See Working Party Report, supra note 3, para. 170. The possibility that preferential 
loans from state-owned banks might amount to an actionable subsidy was raised by the 
WTO Working Party during China's accession negotiations. Id. China's representative re-
sponded by noting that a loan that does not confer a benefit (i.e., a loan on market terms) 
would not amount to a subsidy, stating that "China's objective was that state-owned enter-
prises, including banks, should be run on a commercial basis and be responsible for their 
own profits and losses." Id. 
73 See SCM Agreement, supra note 38, arts. 15-21. The SCM Agreement allows a mem-
ber that has been injured by another member's subsidy policies to respond either by im-
posing countervailing duties (which the Agreement permits if the subsidy has caused "ma-
terial injury" to domestic industry of the importing country), id. art. 19, or by resorting to 
wro dispute settlement, id. arts. 4, 7. 
The U.S. government's review of China's subsidy practices is still ongoing and appears 
to be focused on the elimination of prohibited subsidies (i.e., subsidies that are condi-
tioned upon export or import-substitution). See CoMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 22-
23. While the USTR has concerns regarding the sufficiency of China's wro notification 
regarding prohibited subsidies, the USTR has offered technical assistance to the Chinese 
authorities to improve notification in this area. See id. 
338 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:319 
banking system through competition from foreign enterprises. Under 
the GATS, each WfO member negotiated schedules of individual 
commitments to allow market access and/or to grant national treat-
ment to foreign service providers across four different modes of sup-
ply: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, 
and presence of natural persons. 74 In its GATS Schedule of Specific 
Commitments, China agreed to eliminate all "nonprudential" restric-
tions on the banking sector, including ownership and operation re-
strictions, by December 2006.7.5 If they meet the minimum asset re-
quirements spelled out in the schedule,76 foreign banks will be 
allowed to establish branches or subsidiaries in. China. Finally, foreign 
banks will be able to engage in local currency transactions after three 
years of profitable business operation in China.77 
While some observers have expressed concern that the competi-
tion from foreign banks could divert sufficiently large amounts of 
domestic deposits out of the state-owned banks to threaten the col-
lapse of China's domestic banking system,78 others predict that for-
eign participation will force Chinese banks to more effectively com-
pete and that their existence will not be jeopardized.79 Indeed, a 
74 See HoEKMAN & KosTECKI, supra note 14, at 250-51 (explaining the four modes of 
supply covered under GATS). Market access and national treatment commitments under 
the GATS operate through a "positive list" approach-that is, WTO members are only 
obligated to extend national treatment or provide market access with respect to service 
sectors and modes of supply listed in that member's GATS schedule. Id. at 254 n.4. Even 
where a given service sector is listed, such obligations apply only to the extent that exemp-
tions are not otherwise specified in the schedule. !d. 
75 See Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 34, at 34-36 (agreeing to elimi-
nate restrictions within five years after accession). 
76 Id. Banks must have total assets of more than US $10 billion (in the case of a sub-
sidiary) or $20 billion (in the case of a branch) at the end of the year prior to filing the 
application. Id. 
77 Id.; see CoMPLIANCE REPORT, mpra note 12, at 41. Since accession China has gener-
ally complied with its GATS commitments in the banking sector. Although the U.S. gov-
ernment has complained that regulations enacted by the Bank of China on foreign bank-
ing operations impose prudential rules (such as minimum capital requirements) that "far 
exceed international norms," it also concedes that these measures have "kept pace" with 
China's WTO commitments. See id. 
78 See LARDY, supra note 11, at 114 (citing a study by a Chinese Central Bank researcher 
that predicts that foreign banks will capture 15% of China's domestic currency market by 
2007); Bradsher, New Challenge, supra note 65 (citing "pessimists" who warn of a possible 
collapse of China's domestic banking system if it loses deposits and borrowers continue to 
default). 
79 See LARDY, supra note 11, at 119. Nicholas Lardy notes that as of 2000, the percent-
age of financial assets in China owned by foreign financial institutions was only 1.5%. /d. at 
115. He predicts that even after 2007, when China has agreed to eliminate all "non-
prudential" restrictions on foreign banks, foreign banks operating in China will continue 
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number of foreign banks, such as Citibank, ABN Amro, and the Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Bank, have already entered China's market and 
are competing with domestic banks for the country's most creditwor-
thy borrowers.80 There is even some early evidence that Chinese banks 
are learning and improving from the example and competitive pres-
sure of foreign banks operating in China.st 
To summarize, although far-reaching and potentially onerous, 
the commitments that China has undertaken in its protocol of acces-
sion will open the Chinese market to competition and pressure the 
government to end its practice of protecting inefficient state-owned 
enterprises-a practice that is a drag on the economy and threatens 
the continued stability of China's banking system. In the same way, 
the external pressure ofWfO obligations may accelerate China's pro-
cess of legal reform, as discussed in Part II below. 
D. Comparisons with Eastern Europe Under GATT 
The importance of WfO accession as a component of China's 
economic reform program can be contrasted with the experience of 
other Communist countries. There are a number of former Commu-
nist countries such as Mongolia or Albania that joined the WfO after 
the fall of Communism in their respective countries.82 In contrast, 
China's continuing efforts to qualifY for WfO accession (and later, to 
comply with the obligations of membership) has proceeded under the 
control of the CCP. While China is the only Communist country other 
to be limited by two constraints: first, the prudential and regulatory requirements imposed 
on Chinese banks; and second, the availability of creditworthy Chinese borrowers. ld. at 
118-19. Lardy concludes that, with the introduction of foreign banks into the Chinese 
market, "Chinese banks are likely to face serious competitive pressure, even if foreign 
banks do not drain off a large-enough share of deposits to endanger the liquidity of do-
mestic banks." I d. at 119. 
80 See Bradsher, New Challenge, supra note 65. 
81 Id. Bradsher indicates that the entry of foreign banking in China has caused Chi-
nese banks to offer new products, such as mortgages and credit cards with revolving lines 
of credit. Foreign competition has also forced Chinese banks to expand into loan syndica-
tion and accounts-receivable financing, areas that Chinese banks had ignored in the past. 
See Karby Legett, Citibank Stirs Fear in China by Buying Pile of Unpaid bills, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
27, 2002. Chinese banks are learning from Citibank's example how to develop more so-
phisticated techniques for servicing corporate clients, such as offering "their own, vastly 
improved cash-management products." Id. 
82 See WTO Website, supra note 1. There are a number of post-Communist countries 
that have acceded to the WTO. ld. Mongolia became a member of the WTO in 1997 and 
Albania in 2000. ld. Similar examples include Slovenia (1995), Moldova (2001), Georgia 
(2000), Estonia (1999), Latvia (1999), Lithuania (2001), and Armenia (2003). ld. Russia is 
currently in the process of negotiating the terms of its accession. !d. 
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than Cuba to gain accession to the Wf0,83 a number of Communist 
countries in Eastern Europe joined the GATT during the 1960-70s. 
The experience of these countries provides an interesting counterex-
ample to the Chinese one. 
There were three Communist countries that joined the GATT 
during this period: Poland in 1967, Romania in 1971, and Hungary in 
1973.84 These countries' interest in the GATT coincided with the post-
Stalinist period in Eastern Europe and its corresponding focus on 
raising technical standards and improving the standard of living in 
socialist countries.B5 The terms of GATT accession for Hungary rec-
ognized the more decentralized nature of trade in Hungary's eco-
nomic system-the terms of accession were based, at least in princi-
ple, on the existing GATT framework of tariff schedules.86 In contrast, 
83 See U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, http:/ /www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2004) (containing general information for each country of the world). 
At present, only five countries in the world are still Communist: North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, 
Cuba, and China. /d. Of these, the only other WTO member is Cuba, an original signatory to 
the GAlT but a tiny member whose involvement in the organization became severely limited 
after Fidel Castro came to power. See Grzybowski, supra note 32, at 547. 
84 See KosTECKI, supra note 32, at xv, 25. Although Czechoslovakia was an original con-
tracting party to the GAlT, its status as a GAlT member was irrelevant in practice, as it was 
treated by the West similarly to other non-GAlT-member, Eastern European countries. /d. 
Both politically and economically, \Ugoslavia was a special case. \Ugoslavia gained ad-
mission to the GAlT in 1966, as a country with some state trading but whose foreign trade 
was based on a tariff system. /d. at 25-27. Eighteen years earlier, in 1948, the Tito regime 
broke with Stalinism, decentralized its economic system on the basis of "workers' self-
management," and established itself politically as a nonaligned country. See id. at 25; Karen 
Halverson, Privatization in the Yugoslav Republics, 25 J. WoRLD ThADE 43, 46-47 (1991) (de-
scribing workers' self-management). Mter 1965, \Ugoslavia underwent a major program of 
economic reforms, which among other things facilitated the registration of new trading 
enterprises, liberalized foreign investment, loosened import controls, eliminated the li-
censing of exports, and allowed \Ugoslav banks to borrow from abroad. See Harriet Mate-
jka, Foreign Trade Systems, in THE NEw EcoNOMIC SYsTEMs OF EASTERN EuROPE 443, 468-69 
(Hans-Hermann Hohmann et al. eds., 1975) [hereinafter NEw EcoNOMIC SYSTEMS]. Al-
though \Ugoslavia's 1965 economic reform program roughly coincided with GAlT acces-
sion and may have been motivated in part by a desire to gain accession to the GAlT, it 
appears that \Ugoslavia's ability to adapt to the GAlT system was due to its unique political 
and economic approach-in other words, \Ugoslavia's economic and political reform pro-
vided the preconditions and momentum for eventual GAlT membership, instead of the 
other way around. /d. 
85 KosTECKI, supm note 32, at 6; see also Grzybowski, supra note 32, at 552-53 (quoting 
a Soviet author who recognized the importance of economic cooperation as a means of 
acquiring Western machinery, equipment, and technology). 
86 See KosTECKI, supra note 32, at 31; Grzybowski, supra note 32, at 549. Although 
Hungary decentralized its foreign trade operations and shifted from a target-based to a 
tariff-based system, this does not necessarily mean that foreign trade in Hungary was de-
termined by market forces. See KosTECKI, supra note 32, at 31; Grzybowski, supra note 32, 
at 549. Its economy remained fundamentally socialist in nature, and therefore was ulti-
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Poland and Romania joined the GATI without reforming their for-
eign trade systems, which, instead of utilizing tariffs, were based on 
targets specified in an economic plan.87 Instead of negotiating tariff 
reduction commitments, Poland and Romania each agreed to in-
crease their level of imports from GATI member countries by a 
specified amount.88 In addition, the countries agreed to submit to pe-
riodic reviews that focused on the direction and make-up of each 
country's foreign trade.89 In spite of its inconsistency with the MFN 
obligation, the new GATI members were permitted to trade on spe-
cial terms with the bloc of countries in the Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON).90 
mately controlled not by the market, but by the state. See, e.g., Gabor Revesz, Hungmy, in 
NEw EcoNOMIC SYSTEMS, supra note 84, at 155, 165 (describing Hungary's 1968 economic 
reforms as "[t]he new mechanism of the Hungarian socialist planned economy"). 
Consider the following observation of an East-West trade scholar, who emphasizes the 
central difference between foreign trade in market versus planned economies as relating 
to the degree of government control over trade: 
Tariffs in socialist economies have little influence on the volume of imports 
.... Tariffs are a non-essential part of the import control system. More 
efficient methods to regulate the flow of imports are licensing and foreign 
currency controls. They are practiced in Hungary as well as in other socialist 
countries. Indeed they are an indispensable instrument in realizing the goals 
and targets of the economic plan. However unrestrained and competitive 
Hungarian trade agencies may be in the selection of their trading partners 
and of the assortment of imported goods, they still need to obtain import li-
censes and foreign currency allocations .... 
Grzybowski, supra note 32, at 551. The implication of Professor Grzybowski's observation is 
that any tariff concessions contained in Hungary's GATT schedule would be ineffective if 
the government restricted access to imports by withholding licenses or access to foreign 
currency. See id. 
87 KosTECKI, supra note 32, at 27. Like Hungary, Poland experimented with a program 
of decentralization during the early 1970s and again during the 1980s. See Perestroika Survey, 
ThE EcoNoMIST, Apr. 28, 1990, at 10. 
BB Poland agreed to "increase the total value of its imports from the territories of the 
contracting parties by not less than 7 per cent per annum." KosTECKI, supra note 32, at 94 
(quoting GATT B.I.S.D. (15th Supp.) at 52 (1968) ). As a developing country with greater 
balance of payments constraints, Romania sought a more flexible formula. Id. at 96. 
Therefore, Romania's terms of accession stated that it "firmly intends" to increase the 
value of its imports from GATT members "at a rate not smaller than the growth of total 
Romanian imports provided for in its Five-Year Plan." !d. at 96 (quoting GATT B.I.S.D. 
(19th Supp.) at 10 (1972)). 
89 Poland agreed to annual consultations whereas Romania and Hungary agreed to 
consultations every other year. See KosTECKI, supm note 32, at 108. 
90 See id. at 104-06. The fact that trade within the CMEA was based on economic plan-
ning complicated any attempt to compare the terms of trade with GATT versus CMEA 
trading partners. Id. Even Hungary, which as noted above modified foreign trading to a 
tariff-based system for GATT purposes, continued to trade with CMEA countries on the 
342 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:319 
The accession of Hungary, Poland, and Romania to the GATT dur-
ing the 1960-70s represented an important change in thinking regard-
ing the role of Communist governments in the world trade system.91 
However, the participation of these countries in the GATT failed to 
achieve a meaningful integration of their economies into the world 
trading system and did not affect fundamental reform within the coun-
tries. In terms of overall trade flows, a study of the effects of GATT ac-
cession for Hungary, Poland, and Romania shows that the balance of 
trade for all three countries vis-a-vis the GATT countries was generally 
negative.92 While imports from GATT countries increased dramatically 
during the early 1970s, the increase is attributable mainly to the avail-
ability of Western credit to importers.93 Indeed, countries such as Po-
land resorted to bilateral arrangements to eliminate persistent, dis-
criminatory trade restrictions against Polish exports that the GATT 
framework was ineffective in addressing.94 Professor Kostecki concludes 
that GATT membership was of more symbolic than practical impor-
tance for these countries: 
When judged from a political perspective, the GATT East-
West arrangements are second-best solutions-both for the 
basis of long-term agreements controlled by the requirements of economic planning. See 
Grzybowski, supra note 32, at 551. 
91 See id. at 552 (stating that the primary significance of the socialist countries' GATI 
accession was as a "reaffirmation that these four countries, traditionally a part of Western 
spiritual and economic reality, are finding their way into the old pattern of coexistence"). 
92 See KosTECKI, supra note 32, at 127-28. GATI accession did not result in the elimi-
nation of politically motivated restrictions imposed by Western countries on East European 
imports. !d. at 98-99. Even after the accession of Hungary, Poland, and Romania to the 
GATI, a number of Western European countries maintained discriminatory quantitative 
restrictions on Eastern European imports, and the United States refused to grant MFN 
status to Hungary or Romania. !d. Nor was the GATI ultimately effective in shifting the 
trade of these countries away from the CMEA. !d. By 1987, Poland's exports amounted to 
only 11.2% of GDP, and CMEA countries still accounted for over 40% of Poland's exports. 
See Jaroslaw Pietras, The Role of the WTO for Economies in Transition, in THE WTO AS AN IN-
TERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 353, 354 (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 1998). 
93 See KosTECKI, supra note 32, at 118. Professor Kostecki observes that the increase of 
imports from the West into Poland, Hungary, and Romania during this period was not due 
to GAIT concessions, which he describes as "either meaningless or of a limited value," but 
rather due to grants of "sizeable Western credits" to importers. !d. One consequence of 
increased trade with the \Vest on generous credit terms was the accumulation of external 
debt burdens that ultimately led to high inflation rates in these economies in the late 
1980s. See Halverson, supra note 84, at 47. 
94 KosTECKI, supra note 32, at 122-23 (observing that the eventual relaxation of dis-
criminatory restrictions maintained by countries such as Austria, Denmark, Italy, and Swe-
den against Polish imports was achieved through bilateral agreement and not through 
GAIT action). 
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socialist bloc and the West. The GATT did not really succeed 
in becoming an instrument of Western policy .... despite 
the favouritism displayed toward the East European coun-
tries admitted to the GATT, Washington and Western 
Europe did not really grant them better commercial treat-
ment than those East European states remaining outside the 
organization.95 
343 
China's terms of accession to the WTO required deep concessions on 
China's part and afforded China full participation as a WTO member 
and participant in the international market system. In contrast, East-
ern Europe's participation in the GATT was ultimately too limited in 
scope to overcome the political barriers between the Soviet Bloc and 
Western countries. 
The reforms that occurred within these countries were also limited 
in scope. Even in more decentralized economies such as Hungary, the 
means of production were predominantly owned and controlled by the 
state until the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc in 1989. By the mid-
1980s, the share of state trading as a proportion of value added in the 
economy was over eighty percent in Hungary, Poland, and \Ugoslavia.96 
Although pricing decisions in these economies were delegated to en-
terprises, in reality prices were not determined by market forces, but 
rather were manipulated by enterprise management for political or 
other reasons.97 Eastern Europe's experience thus illustrates the limita-
tions of the GATT in inducing reform in socialist countries. 
While WTO accession has had a profound impact on both eco-
nomic and legal reform in China, there is little evidence that participa-
tion in the GATT played a significant role in influencing reform in 
Eastern Europe. Several reasons could be offered to explain the differ-
ence. First, unlike the GATT, the WTO is a global trade organization 
95 Id. at 137-38. 
96 See Business in Eastern Europe Survey, THE EcoNOMIST, Sept. 21, 1991, at 10. In con-
trast with the United States, whose state-owned sector accounted for 1% of value-added in 
the mid-1980s, the corresponding percentages for Eastern Europe include Hungary 
(86%), Poland (82%), Yugoslavia (87%), and Czechoslovakia (97%). ld. 
97 See Janos Kornai, The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes and Reality, in REMAK-
ING THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF SoCIALISM: CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE 44-46 (Vic-
tor Nee & David Stark eds., 1989) (discussing "soft budget constraints" and the arbitrari-
ness of prices set in decentralized socialist enterprises). Hungarian enterprises had little 
incentive to cut costs or otherwise compete, since they had access to subsidies, tax breaks, 
or other bail-outs from the state. Id. Hungarian economistJinos Kornai coined the phrase 
"soft budget constraint" to describe this phenomenon. Id. 
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with an expanded mandate,98 a formal structure, an ongoing process 
for conducting trade policy reviews of its members,99 and a binding 
dispute settlement mechanism.100 As a consequence, the terms of acces-
sion to the vVTO are much more extensive and rigorous than the terms 
of accession to the GATT.1o1 Second, the political constraints in each 
case were very different. Since the advent of China's "open door" policy 
in the late 1970s, the CCP has made market reform part of its ideology 
and has staked its legitimacy on the success of economic reform. In 
contrast, the reforms in Eastern Europe that coincided with GATT ac-
cession were constrained by the influence and control ofthe Soviet Un-
ion. Thus, whereas the Soviet Union merely acquiesced in Eastern 
Europe's experimentation with GATT membership, China's Commu-
nist leaders have actively sought wro accession as a means of further-
ing its market-oriented agenda. Finally, the eventual collapse of the 
Eastern Bloc, a growing consensus among countries in favor of market-
based economic policies, and the forces of globalization have all en-
hanced the ability of the wro as an institution to influence policy 
within a given member country. 
Notwithstanding the differences, there are a number of interest-
ing parallels between the past experience of the Eastern European 
countries and present-day China. First, the current crisis that China 
faces with its debt burden and "soft budget constraints" on Chinese 
enterprises mirrors the economic problems that Poland, Hungary, 
98 See HoEKMAN & KosTECKI, supra note 14, at 41. The adoption of the Uruguay 
Round agreements in 1995 led to more stringent rules in areas such as agriculture, subsi-
dies, and safeguards. In addition, the scope of the WTO agreements expanded into previ-
ously uncharted areas, including trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property. Finally, the fact that countries were obligated to sign on to the Uruguay Round 
agreements as part of a "single undertaking" expanded the scope of obligation for devel-
oping countries that previously opted out of certain of the GATT agreements. !d. at 49. 
99 See supra note 43 for a discussion of the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
(TPRM). 
100 Among other things, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding formalizes the 
dispute settlement process by allowing the right of appeal of WTO panel decisions to a 
permanent Appellate Body (art. 17) and providing for the automatic adoption of Appel-
late Body decisions unless the WTO decides by consensus not to adopt the report (art. 
17.14). Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 17, WTO Agreement, supra note 38, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). 
101 For a discussion of how the WTO facilitated the economic transition of Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Romania, and Hungary, see Pietras, supra note 92, at 355-59. Pietras de-
scribes the economic situation of these countries prior to the late 1980s as characterized by 
"relative autarky" vis-a-vis the industrialized countries. !d. at 354. 
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and \'ilgoslavia faced in the 1980s.l02 The debt and soft budget con-
straints are problems that result from partial liberalization of the state-
owned sector. Second, as elaborated below, 103 the dramatic scope of 
legal and economic reform in China over the past twenty years has 
created a crisis of values in China. The vacuum created by political 
liberalization and the introduction of a new legal framework in China 
has caused a rise in corruption and a sort of moral schizophrenia. 
This crisis of values mirrors similar crises experienced by countries in 
the Eastern Bloc, illustrated most dramatically in Yugoslavia, where 
dramatic legal and economic reform, along with the disintegration of 
the country, fueled intense nationalism, ethnic cleansing, and war. 
Indeed, what sets China's example apart from other WTO mem-
bers is the degree to which China's WTO undertakings served as a 
catalyst of legal and economic reform within the country. The follow-
ing section describes China's WTO obligations relating to transpar-
ency and considers the degree to which accession has and will con-
tribute to legal change in China. 
II. WTO AccESSION AND LEGAL REFoRM: UNDERTAKINGS 
RELATING TO TRANSPARENCY 
The previous section of this Article discusses how China's WTO 
commitments may help propel economic reform through a politically 
difficult phase. WTO accession encompasses not only commitments to 
eliminate tariff and non tariff barriers to trade in goods but also a range 
of related commitments, including commitments to eliminate subsidies 
and to open service sectors to foreign participation. In addition to 
trade liberalization commitments, the WTO agreements include a spe-
cial set of obligations that aim to promote transparency, predictability, 
and fairness in the implementation of China's WTO obligations. These 
fall into three general categories: obligations relating to public avail-
ability of trade-related laws, uniform administration of the laws, and the 
existence of an independent and impartial system for the review of ad-
ministrative decisions. 104 China's undertakings in promoting transpar-
102 See Kornai, supra note 97, at 44-46 (using the term "soft budget constraint" to de-
scribe the problems that Hungarian state-owned enterprises faced as the country pursued 
economic reform throughout the 1980s.); see also Halverson, supm note 84, at 46-48 (de-
scribing similar problems in Yugoslavia). 
103 See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing corruption/moral crisis 
in China). 
104 See Protocol, supra note 17, pt. I, para. 2. This Article uses the term "transparency-
related rules" in referencing the publication, uniform administration, and independent 
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ency, although limited in scope to the enforcement of China's WfO 
commitments, have provided an impetus for legal reform in China. 
The concept of transparency is central to the WfO agreements. 
Article X of the GATT 1994 requires that all trade-related laws, regula-
tions, and rulings be promptly published and administered in an "im-
partial and uniform" manner.I05 The Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects oflntellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) devotes an 
entire chapter to enforcement obligations,106 and the GATS, in addi-
tion to publication and notification requirements, requires setting up 
"enquiry points" to provide information at the request of any mem-
ber.107 Thus, the transparency-related obligations contained in the 
wro agreements encompass not only the publication of trade-related 
laws, but also their accessibility as well as fair and effective implemen-
tation. In addition to these obligations, China's protocol of accession 
includes a number of specific commitments that confirm as well as 
supplement the obligations contained in the WfO agreements. This 
section describes these rules, points out certain obstacles to their ef-
fective implementation, and notes the extent to which the Chinese 
government has achieved progress in implementation. 
There has been much written regarding the differences between 
China's legal culture and that of Western countries, including debate 
review rules contained in China's protocol and in the wro agreements. Of course, there 
are other mechanisms in the wro agreements that promote transparency, in particular, 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (de-
scribing China's transparency commitment). China's protocol goes beyond the require-
ments of other wro members by subjecting China's legal and economic system to review 
under the TPRM every year for the first eight years after China's accession. See Protocol, 
supra note 17, pt. I, para. 18. 
105 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. X, 61 Stat. A-11, 
T.I.A.S. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
106 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
arts. 41-63, Wf0 Agreement, supra note 38, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY RouND, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). Specifically, the TRIPS Agreement requires 
the availability to intellectual property right-holders of "civil judicial procedures" for intel-
lectual property enforcement, id. art. 42, and that laws, regulations, and rulings pertaining 
to intellectual property protection and enforcement be published and available upon the 
request of another member, id. art. 63. 
The SCM and Anti-Dumping Agreements also contain transparency-related require-
ments. See SCM Agreement, supra note 38, arts. 12, 13; Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra 
note 44, arts. 22, 23 (requiring public notice of anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
investigations, written explanation of the basis on which determinations are made, and the 
availability of judicial, arbitral, or administrative review of final determinations). 
107 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 111.4, WfO Agreement, 
supra note 38, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 
I.L.M. 1168 (1994). 
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on the degree to which China is a country governed by the "rule of 
law. "1°8 This Article does not address all of these questions but instead 
describes the transparency-related rules that bind China as a WTO 
member and assesses the general progress China has made, and the 
challenges that remain, in implementing these obligations. When 
compared with the state of affairs in 1978, China has made impressive 
progress in creating the legal framework necessary to support a mar-
ket economy. Certainly, GATT (and later WTO) accession has pro-
ceeded alongside this massive rebuilding of China's legal system-a 
system that was virtually wiped out during the Cultural Revolution. 109 
Yet it is increasingly apparent that WTO accession has also provided a 
catalyst for China's evolution away from a legal system driven by 
power relationships and towards a rule-based legal system. 
A. Background on the Legal Profession in China 
Any assessment of China's efforts towards establishing transpar-
ency, uniform application of law, and judicial review should be mind-
ful of the mammoth task that the regime faced at the end of the Cul-
tural Revolution, when China's wrecked legal and political system had 
to be rebuilt from scratch. Viewed from this perspective, the progress 
that China has made in establishing a judiciary and a practicing bar 
are incomplete but nonetheless substantial.ll0 As a Chinese observer 
once said, Chinese law is "like a baby that has not grown up yet. "lll 
The Chinese government reestablished the legal profession in 
the early 1980s with the issuance of "provisional regulations" on law-
108 See generally CHINA's LEGAL REFORMS (Stanley Luhman ed., 1996) (containing pa-
pers by various authors); THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA (Karen G. Turner et 
al. eds., 2000) (containing papers by various authors addressing rule of law related issues 
in China); STANLEY B. LuBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAo 
(1999); PITMAN PoTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL 
CULTURE (2001); Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of the 
Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY 
j. INT'L L. 1 (2001). 
109 See LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 100-01. Although the Cultural Revolution swept 
away all legal institutions in China, these institutions had already been rendered practically 
irrelevant under Communist rule. Id. 
no See CHEN, supra note 7, at 97. In 1993, the National People's Congress (NPC) and 
its Standing Committee adopted an average of one law every eighteen days. Id. at 97 n.l. 
In addition to building a practicing bar and judiciary, throughout the reform era China 
promulgated literally thousands of laws and regulations. By 1998, the NPC and its Standing 
Committee had enacted 328 statutes and decisions, the State Council had issued over 700 
regulations, and regional bodies had adopted over 5000 local rules. I d. 
111 LUBMAN, supm note 108, at 126 (quoting the daughter of a Chinese high govern-
ment official). 
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yers, which defined the lawyer's role as "serv[ing] the cause of social-
ism" and "protect[ing] the interests of the state and the collective. "112 
In terms of sheer numbers, the number of lawyers in China has grown 
dramatically, from almost none at the start of reform to over 110,000 
trained and registered lawyers in 1997.113 The demand for lawyers in 
China increased rapidly throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as market 
reform transformed business practice, foreign investment flowed into 
the country, and the Chinese began defending their rights in court.114 
Today, the caliber of lawyer one sees in Beijing or Shanghai rivals that 
of lawyers in the West; however, the overall qualifications of the legal 
profession in China are still uneven.115 
As with the legal profession, China's judiciary was reestablished in 
1979, at the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's reforms and in a manner 
that reflected the strong ideological influence of the CCP. 116 Through-
out the 1980s, most Chinese judges lacked either a university education 
or legal instruction, and they were transferred to their posts from the 
CCP or from the military. 117 Since that time, the court system has in-
creased significantly in size (from 58,000 "court cadres" in 1979 to 
250,000 judges in 1997) 118 and, although still somewhat politicized,119 
112 !d. at 154 (citing "Provisional Regulations on Lawyers." passed on Aug. 26, 1980). 
The Provisional Regulations are translated in 1 CHINA L. REP. 217, 217-21, by Tao-tai Hsia 
and Charlotte Hambley. The more recent 1997 law on lawyers defines the lawyer's role as a 
professional and provides for the accreditation of lawyers and the regulation of theii activ-
ity. See LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 155-56; Sarah Biddulph, Through a Glass Darkly: China, 
Transparency and the WTO, 3 AusT. J. AsiAN L. 59, 82 (2001) (citing the Lawyers Law, 
Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe!fUo Lushi Fa, 1997). 
m LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 155. 
114 See Minxin Pei, Is China Democratizing?, FoREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 76 [here-
inafter Pei, Is China Democratizing?]. However weak and evolving judicial institutions may be, 
data shows that Chinese people are utilizing the courts to protect individual rights. Between 
1986 and 1996,lawsuits against the government by Chinese citizens increased 12,483 percent. 
See id. In a 1993 poll of over five thousand Chinese, seventy-eight percent of those questioned 
agreed with the statement "Private property is sacred and must not be violated." !d. 
115 Cf LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 155. The Ministry of Justice at first did not requiie 
passing a bar examination to practice law; all that was requiied was a college education 
and some work experience. !d. at 154. The bar examination began to be administered on 
an annual basis only in 1993. !d. at 155. As of 1996, almost thiity percent of Chinese law-
yers had no formal education beyond high school. !d. 
116 !d. at 253. 
117 See id. People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers were considered to be particularly 
good candidates, due to theii experience in "enforcing proletarian dictatorship" and theii 
"appropriate ideological outlook." !d. 
118 I d. 
119 See id. at 256-58 (discussing the degree to which judges are still "soldiers of the 
state" in terms of the government's criteria for advancement and recognition of judicial 
excellence). 
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has developed a more professional competence. A 1995 law imposed 
more exacting qualifications for judges, including minimal education 
and other requirements.l20 Since WTO accession, the government has 
pushed to enhance the capabilities of Chinese judges, as illustrated by 
some recent initiatives. In March 2002, a unified "National Judicial Ex-
amination" was administered to attorneys, judges, and prosecutors.12l 
Although it is not yet a universal prerequisite for serving as a judge, 
passing the examination is required for judicial promotion.l22 More 
recently, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) introduced a reform pack-
age aimed at improving the judiciary, including initiatives to require 
that all future judges pass the national judicial examination, provide 
specialized training for judges, and introduce a system of law clerks.t23 
B. China's Transparency-Related Commitments 
1. Publication and Access to Information 
In its protocol, China agreed that only those WfO-related laws, 
regulations, and other measures that are published and readily avail-
able to other wro members and to the public shall be enforced, and 
that China shall make drafts of all such documents available for com-
ment prior to their implementation or enforcement,l24 In addition, 
China agreed to establish or designate an official journal for the publi-
cation of WfO-related rules, regulations, and other measures and to 
12o See LuBMAN, supra note 108, at 254-56. The Judges Law requires that judges obtain 
a college-level or graduate degree, with a specialization in law, or "professional legal 
knowledge" plus two years of work experience. I d. at 255. The Judges Law provides for the 
use of exams as a basis for promotion, annual performance reviews, and the dismissal of 
any judge who has been rated "incompetent" for two years in a row. Id. at 255-56. An 
amendment to the Judges Law recently raised the minimum educational requirement to a 
"university degree." Shao Zongwei, Reforms to Impro~e Quality of judges, CHINA DAILY, July 8, 
2002, at 1. 
121 China Sets Up judicial Exam for judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, Feb. 7, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mp File. 
122 See id. Although at least 360,000 people registered for the examination, the Chinese 
government reported that only seven percent of those who took the examination passed. 
Id.; Feng Qihua, More QJ.talifiedjudges Needed, CHINA DAILY, July 23, 2002, at 4. 
m Shao, supra note 120, at 1. 
124 Protocol, supra note 17, pt. I, para. 2(C) (1). As for the consultation requirement, 
although China does not have in place a universal system for receiving public input on 
draft legislation, when drafting legislation, Chinese officials often consult with foreign 
experts and take into account the content of foreign laws. See Biddulph, supra note 112, at 
72-73. 
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make copies of the journal readily available.l25 Finally, China agreed to 
establish an inquiry point where all such information may be ob-
tained.126 
Chinese law currently requires that all legislation be published, 
typically in the gazette of the body that issued the legislation and 
sometimes in the national daily newspaper. 127 The obstacle in imple-
menting the WTO publication requirements relates less to China's 
formal legislation than to making public the overlapping rules and 
less formal interpretations of law issued within China's bureaucracy. 
Below the level oflegislation issued by the National People's Congress 
(NPC) 12s and administrative regulation is an amorphous category of 
administrative directives referred to as rules (guizhang) and normative 
documents (guifanxing wenjian) that are issued by central and local 
government bodies as a means of instructing those vested with 
authority to carry out the law.129 In the early years of economic reform 
in China, it was standard practice for Chinese bureaucrats to issue 
such administrative directives, which had legal effect but were "inter-
nal" or unpublished.l30 As discussed below,131 the use of such direc-
tives has decreased but has not disappeared. 
125 Protocol, supra note 17, pt. I, para. 2 (C) (2). The publication requirement applies 
specifically to all "laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in 
goods, services, TRIPs or the control of foreign exchange." ld. The WTO Working Party 
Report, supra note 3, para. 334, also states that China agreed to make available translations 
of these laws "in one or more of the official languages of the WTO." 
126 Protocol, supra note 17, para. 2(C) (3). There is an exception to the publication ob-
ligation for laws involving national security, foreign exchange or monetary policy, or other 
measures, "the publication of which would impede law enforcement." ld. 
127 Biddulph, supra note 112, at 64 n.11, 67 (citing the PRC Legislation Law, Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa, effective Jul. 1, 2000 [hereinafter Legislation Law]). 
128 See CHEN, supra note 7, at 101-03. The National People's Congress (NPC) is China's 
legislature. Id. at 101. China's Constitution vests exclusive power to enact "basic law" in the 
NPC. ld. The Standing Committee, a part of the NPC, is vested with authority to enact 
other laws. ld. at 102. Thus the laws enacted by the NPC and its Standing Committee enjoy 
the highest status in the hierarchy of Chinese law, subordinate only to the Constitution. !d. 
at 101-03. 
129 See CHEN, supra note 7, at 118-19; Biddulph, supra note 112, at 64-65 (discussing 
the ambiguous status of government rules and normative documents); Peerenboom, supra 
note 108, at 216 (providing a helpful description of the legislative hierarchy and observing 
that the distinction between rules and normative documents is often difficult to make). 
130 LuBMAN, supra note 108, at 197. Prior to 1979, "many if not most" laws and regula-
tions were for internal circulation only. Id. at 146. Professor Lubman observes that the 
practice of issuing internal regulations is not only a feature of Communist systems, but 
mirrors traditional Chinese conceptions about law. !d. at 146-47. Such rules, which West-
erners regard as "legal," were not intended to provide notice to the public but rather 
served the purpose of guiding bureaucrats in the execution of their work. !d. 
131 See infra Part II.B.3. 
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A recently adopted Chinese law requires the publication of all 
legislation, not only NPC-level legislation and amendments, but also 
administrative regulations, local and regional regulations, departmen-
tal rules, and local level rules-that is, everything except normative 
documents.l32 To the extent that normative documents are unen-
forceable (i.e., are not "law"), the publication requirements set forth 
in the law are consistent with China's WTO obligations. However, as 
discussed below, the continued legal status of normative documents 
remains unclear.l33 
Even assuming that all governmental directives that have the effect 
of law are published, as a practical matter it is very difficult to access 
them. Therefore, the protocol specifically requires China to publish an 
official journal and establish a single inquiry point for WTO-related 
material.134 Just prior to China's WTO accession, China's Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and. Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) established 
such an inquiry point, the China WTO Notification and Enquiry Cen-
ter, and has set up a website to facilitate the Center's work of dissemi-
nating information.135 However, there is no single official journal for 
WTO-related law. Although MOFTEC has been publishing foreign in-
vestment and trade-related laws and regulations in an official gazette 
since 1993,136 according to China's Working Party Report, the Chinese 
government listed, not one, but seven official journals that contain 
WTO-related information.137 Nonetheless, establishing an official WTO 
website could greatly facilitate the ability of outsiders to gather legal 
information. The website at least purports to make current information 
1!2 The statute supercedes earlier Chinese Jaw, which did not impose a comprehensive 
publication requirement. Biddulph, supra note 112, at 67 (discussing the Legislation Law). 
I!! See infra note 163 (discussion of normative documents under the ALL). 
!!4 See Protocol, supra note 17, pt. I, para. 2. 
!!5 See China Establishes WTO-Related Organizations, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Oct. 31, 
2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File (announcing the establishment of the 
China WTO Notification and Enquiry Center). Information regarding the WTO 
Notification Center can be found on the Chinese government's new website on the WTO. 
See infra note 138. 
us Biddulph, supra note 112, at 68. 
1!7 Working Party Report, supra note 3, para. 325. These official sources include, in 
addition to the "MOFTEC Gazette," the "Gazette of the People's Republic of China State 
Council," and the "Collection of the Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of 
China." A recent article in China Daily suggests that the Chinese government views the 
publication requirement as requiring publication in "an" official journal (as opposed to 
"the" official journal). See Meng Yan, Legislative Efforts Benefit wro Accession, CHINA DAILY, 
Jan. 7, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Chidly File (quoting a government official 
who pledged that all WTO-related laws and regulations involving intellectual property "will 
be published in an official journal"). 
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regarding the WTO accessible to the public, provides links to China's 
WTO-related laws and regulations, and allows visitors to ask ques-
tions.l3S 
2. Uniform Administration 
China agreed in its protocol to apply and administer all WTO-
related laws, regulations, and other measures in a ''uniform, impartial 
and reasonable manner. "139 Scholars of Chinese law express skepti-
cism regarding China's ability to meet this obligation, which assumes 
the existence of enforcement institutions with clear lines of authority 
and the capacity to render neutral decisions.146-There are a number of 
characteristics of China's system that impede the impartiality and 
predictability of those who administer the law. 
First, Chinese legislation tends to be drafted in vague terms, with a 
lack of specific definition. HI These tentative, broadly worded rules cre-
ate a broad sphere of authority and promote discretionary decision-
making on the part of interpretive bodies.142 One consequence of this 
state of affairs is that Chinese bureaucrats are vested with great discre-
tionary power. Second, perhaps due to the relative newness of China's 
lawmaking institutions, the authority among China's main legislative 
bodies to create law is ill-defined.143 This results in a proliferation of 
158 See China to open Official WTO Website, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Sept. 12, 2002, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File. MOITEC launched the official website on Sep-
tember 13, 2002. See id. The website, which at present is only available in Chinese, includes 
basic knowledge about the WTO, current announcements, documents relating to China's 
accession, Chinese laws and regulations relating to foreign trade and the economy, and 
links to other Chinese websites that contain trade-related statistics and regulations. See id. 
According to government reports, the website can also accommodate questions from those 
who visit it. See id. The website can be accessed at http:/ /www.chinawto.gov.cn (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2003). Id. 
189 Protocol, supra note 17, pt. I, para. 2(A) (2). 
140 See supra notes 137-38. 
141 See LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 147 (describing the techniques that characterize 
Chinese legislative drafting, including "the use of general principles, vagueness and ambi-
guity, undefined terms, broadly worded discretion, omissions and general catch-all 
phrases"). 
142 See CHEN, supra note 7, at 106. According to one Chinese legal scholar, without in-
terpretation by legislative, judicial, and administrative bodies, Chinese law would be "un-
usable, if not meaningless. • I d. 
145 See, e.g., CHEN, supra note 7, at 115-17 (discussing the lack of clarity regarding the 
scope of authority and relative power among three of China's primary lawmaking bodies: 
the NPC, the NPC Standing Committee, and the State Council). Similarly, it is difficult to 
define the boundaries of power between central and local government bodies. Id. at 117. 
Professor Chen provides the example of a "provisional regulation • issued in Fujian prov-
ince, which purports to prescribe crime and punishment even though the Constitution 
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sometimes overlapping or contradictory laws at all levels of govern-
ment. Finally, those vested with broad discretion to interpret and im-
plement the laws tend not to be neutral but rather are influenced by a 
range of extralegal factors, including the political influence of the CCP, 
corruption, and the traditional importance in Chinese culture of per-
sonal relationships (guanxi). These factors are discussed in greater de-
tail below.144 
While acknowledging the reasons for skepticism regarding uni-
form application of law in China, it is important at the same time to 
appreciate the extent to which the CCP promotes and supports legal 
reform. China's government has aggressively moved to create legal in-
stitutions to support the development of a market. The CCP's emphasis 
on legal reform dates back to Deng Xiaoping's "two hands" policy, 
which called for the development of the economy on one hand and the 
strengthening of the legal system on the other. 145 The regime under-
stands the need for a stable legal infrastructure, including neutral ap-
plication and enforcement of the law, to support a market system. In 
addition, fostering neutral and predictable application of law is a 
means of promoting stability, which is of paramount concern to China's 
leaders. WTO accession is providing China's leaders additional leverage 
to push for the implementation of such commitments,l46 although, be-
reserves these matters to the exclusive legislative authority of the NPC. !d. Although in 
theory the NPC could annul the contradictory legislation, such power has never been ex-
ercised. !d. at 117. 
144 See infra notes 161-87 and accompanying text. 
145 CHEN, supra note 7, at 40. One illustration of the importance that the Party attaches 
to legal reform is its launching of successive five-year campaigns for the popularization of 
legal knowledge. See Shao Zongwei, Knowledge of Law a Must for Official Promotion, CHINA 
DAILY, June 4, 2002, at 2. The most recent five-year campaign, for the years 2000-2005, 
features particular emphasis on "rule of law" as opposed to administrative regulation, in-
cluding the laws relating to economic regulation, criminal prohibitions against corruption, 
and the rules of the WTO. See id. The study of such law is a precondition for promotion of 
government officials. See id. 
146 China's official press is replete with examples of officials announcing the impor-
tance of transparency and rule of law in light of the country's WTO obligations. See, e.g., 
Timetable Set for China's Entry to WTO, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Nov. 3, 2001 (trade minister 
quoted as saying that the "most important" change resulting from China's WTO entry will 
be improving transparency of laws); Meng Yan, Legislative Efforts Benefit WTO Accession, 
CHINA DAILY, Jan. 7, 2002 (NPC representative observes that "transparency and public 
participation" have recently been emphasized during the NPC's legislative process after 
China's WTO entry); Shao Zongwei,judicial Rules to Comply with WTO, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 
26, 2002 (senior prosecutor pledges that China's procuracy will incorporate WTO princi-
ples of "openness, integrity and transparency"). 
The government's commitment to transparency in WTO matters extends beyond pub-
lic expressions of support, however. See Working Party Report, supra note 3, para. 75. Dur-
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cause of the factors mentioned above, it is unrealistic to expect that 
these changes will be immediately realized. 
3. Review of Administrative Decisions 
China's protocol requires it to establish (or designate) and main-
tain "impartial and independent tribunals, contact points and proce-
dures" for the prompt review of all administrative actions relating to 
the implementation of the laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and 
administrative rulings of general application referred to in the WTO 
transparency-related rules.l47 Review procedures must include the op-
portunity to ultimately appeal to a judicial body.t4S 
In 1978, China had no meaningful legal institutions. As discussed 
above, the government has made remarkable progress since that time 
in creating a practicing bar and judiciary. In addition, the govern-
ment passed legislation that offers a limited basis on which the admin-
istrative decisions of powerful bureaucrats may be subject to judicial 
review. Finally, the SPC has emerged as an important force in estab-
lishing some degree of coherence to the judicial review process in 
China. The latter two of these developments is discussed below. How-
ever, these encouraging developments must be viewed within the con-
text of China's political situation. Specifically, while Chinese law al-
lows judicial review of administrative acts, and while China's leaders 
remain committed to promoting the professionalism of judges in 
China, the fact remains that the courts enjoy neither power nor inde-
pendence from the CCP. 
As suggested above, government officials in China's huge bu-
reaucracy are very powerful and, in particular, are vested with the 
authority to implement WTO-related law}49 A key question from a 
legal standpoint is the extent to which China's judges have the 
ing China's accession negotiations, China's representative confirmed that, to promote the 
uniform application of WTO-related rules in China, any instance of non-uniform applica-
tion of China's trade regime could be brought to the attention of central government 
authorities, who would contact the responsible government agency to prompdy address 
the situation, "taking into consideration China's international obligations and the need to 
provide a meaningful remedy." /d. 
147 See Protocol, supra note 17, pt. I, para. 2(D)(1). 
148 /d. pt. I, para. 2(D)(2). The Protocol also requires that the relevant tribunal pro-
vide written notice of the decision on appeal, including the reasons for such decision. Id.; 
see also Working Party Report, supra note 3, para. 78 (requiring that the tribunals responsi-
ble for judicial review be "impartial and independent of the agency entrusted with admin-
istrative enforcement" and have no "substantial" interest in the outcome). 
148 See supra notes 134-35. 
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authority to review and correct administrative decisions. While this 
Article does not attempt to summarize all of Chinese administrative 
law, there are a number of statutes150 with features worth highlighting, 
since they reveal the existing limitations of an evolving legal frame-
work for the review of administrative decisions in China. Three of 
these features are described below. 
1. Extrajudicial review. Chinese law provides for the supervision of 
administrative decision-making by administrative or government bod-
ies, conducted either internally (i.e., within the agency hierarchy) or 
externally.l51 The limitation of administrative review, of course, is that 
by definition it is not independent, and thus it may be prone to 
conflicts of in terest.l52 
2. Procedural safeguards for "administrative punishment." At present, 
there is no comprehensive law imposing procedural requirements on 
administrative agencies. 153 There is a 1996 law, the Administrative Pun-
ishments Law (APL), that scholars suggest may be a "blueprint" for 
such a code in the future. 154 The APL is designed to eliminate arbi-
trariness and/ or overlapping assertions of jurisdiction in the imposition 
!50 See generally PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law (Xingzheng fuyi fa, 1999); PRC 
Administrative Supervision Law (Xingzheng jiancha fa, 1997); PRC Administrative Penalties 
Law (Xingzheng chufa fa, 1996) [hereinafter APL); PRC State Compensation Law ( Guojia 
peichang fa, 1994); PRC Administrative Litigation Law (Xingzheng sugong fa, 1989) [herein-
after ALL). These laws are cited in Peerenboom, supra note 108, at 210-11 nn.248-52. See 
also CHEN, supra note 7, at 141-65; Biddulph, supra note 112, at 75-80. 
151 CHEN, supra note 7, at 149, 152. One example of agency review is "administrative 
reconsideration," a type of review typically involving supervision by the next highest ad-
ministrative entity internal to the agency that rendered the challenged decision. ld. at 149. 
Because it is essentially controlled by the bureaucracy, administrative reconsideration has 
been "jealously guarded" by China's bureaucrats as a defense against an expansion of judi-
cial review of administrative acts. !d. 
Another, less frequently utilized type of review is "administrative supervision," which 
may be carried out by CCP officials and other bodies (such as the Ministry of Supervision 
and the Party Discipline Inspection Commission) vested with authority to monitor unlaw-
ful behavior by administrative officials. See id. at 152. The process tends to operate like a 
disciplinary enforcement mechanism rather than an impartial review. ld. at 154. Either 
administrative reconsideration or administrative supervision may be initiated upon the 
petition of a citizen, legal person, or other entity. See Peter Howard Corne, Creation and 
Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM.J. CoMP. L. 369, 427, 435 (2002). For a detailed treat-
ment of these two methods, see Corne, supra, at 426-27; Peerenboom, supra note 108, at 
229-33. 
152 See, e.g., CHEN, supra note 7, at 149, 154. But cf Corne, supra note 151, at 433 (sug-
gesting that although "unpredictable" and depending on the government conducting the 
review, administrative reconsideration can be reasonably professional and impartial). 
153 See Peerenboom, supra note 108, at 192. A more comprehensive Administrative Pro-
cedures Law is being drafted but has not yet passed. !d. 
154 See APL, supra note 150; CHEN, supra note 7, at 142-43. 
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of an administrative "penalty" (such as a fine or revocation of a li-
cense). The APL is a unique Chinese law in the degree to which it in-
corporates procedural safeguards, including the right to a hearing in 
certain cases.155 However, the APL is very limited in its scope. For ex-
ample, the APL does not apply to the many administrative decisions 
that are not "punitive." To the extent that the penalties covered by this 
statute include confinement, the APL resembles a criminal procedure 
statute more than an administrative statute.l56 
3. Limited judicial review of "concrete" acts. The availability of inde-
pendent, judicial review of administrative acts has little precedent in 
China, where administrators tend to enjoy greater power and influence 
than judges, and where judicial and administrative processes tend to 
overlap.157 But in 1989, China adopted a controversial piece of legisla-
tion, the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), which allows an individ-
ual to bring a lawsuit to challenge an administrative decision.158 An ex-
planation of the ALL's novelty to Chinese legal tradition is provided by 
one of the law's drafters: 'The stipulation in the Administrative Litiga-
tion Law that 'common people can sue officials' is an issue that is con-
ceptually rather new. It is a question for which there is no custom and 
to which we have not adapted, and yet it is an enduring issue. "159 
The scope of the ALL was narrowly drawn. Courts may only review 
specific or "concrete" acts, such as the imposition of a fine, the with-
holding of a license, or the breach of a personal or property right.160 
155 See CHEN, supra note 7, at 144-47. The right to hearing applies when "serious" pen-
alties are at stake. Id. In addition, the APL provides that (i) penalties may only be imposed 
and enforced by authorities that are specifically authorized to do so (art. 15), (ii) a penalty 
may not be based on rules contained in internal, or unpublished, documents (art. 4), and 
(iv) no administrative body may impose fines for the same offense twice (art. 24). See id. 
156 See CHEN, supra note 7, at 147 (stating that under the statute, "personal freedoms 
may be restricted up to four years" and noting the APL's resemblance to a criminal stat-
ute). 
157 See generally LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 295 (stating that "[t]he extent of hierarchi-
cal review of judicial decisions, within and between courts ... suggests that Chinese judi-
cial decision-making is more of an administrative process than a judicial one"); Biddulph, 
supra note 112, at 80-81 (referring to the lower status of judges vis-a-vis administrators); 
Peerenboom, supra note 108, at 214-18 (describing factors that weaken China'sjudiciary). 
158 See CHEN, supra note 7, at 155. The ALL is based on a provision in China's 1982 
Constitution, which refers to the rights of citizens to compensation for the infringement of 
civil rights by the state. See id. 
159 !d. at 156 (quoting Wang Han bin, Explanation of the (Draft) Administrative Litigation 
Law of the PRC, Delivered at the 2nd Session of the Seventh NPC (Mar. 28, 1989), translated in 3 
CHINESE LAw AND GovERNMENT 35,35-36 (1991)). 
160 Id. at 157 (citing ALL art. 5). "Concrete" acts (as opposed to "abstract" acts) involve 
specific applications of a rule to a particular case, as opposed to rulemaking. For defini-
tions, see LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 206. 
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This means that a foreign company would not be allowed under the 
ALL to challenge the rulemaking authority of MOITEC, (for example, 
regarding a decision to place a particular good on a restricted import 
list) .161 In addition, courts may only review administrative decisions for 
their legality-that is, they may not inquire into a decision's appropri-
ateness or reasonableness.162 Interestingly, the ALL provides that nei-
ther rules nor normative documents are binding on courts, although 
courts should "consult" any existing rules when rendering a decision. 163 
Although narrow in scope, the ALL has been utilized by Chinese 
plaintiffs with a relatively high success rate.l64 Moreover, even though 
the number of cases decided under the ALL is relatively small, the inci-
dence of lawsuits under the ALL has increased over time while that of 
administrative reconsideration (internal review) has decreased. 165 This 
could mean that Chinese plaintiffs perceive that judicial review under 
the ALL is more effective than internal review. 
The foregoing summary of Chinese legislation demonstrates that 
China has in place a legal framework for promulgating and publish-
161 See Biddulph, supra note 112, at 83. But see Corne, supra note 151, at 428-29 (sug-
gesting that in practice, a court deciding whether to apply a given administrative rule 
amounts to a de facto judgment relating to that rule's validity). 
162 CHEN, supra note 7, at 157 (citing ALL art. 5). 
163 See Peerenboom, supra note 108, at 236-37. The distinction between rules and 
normative documents under Chinese law is addressed at supra notes 127-32 and accompa-
nying text. 
Normative documents are not even mentioned in the ALL, which suggests that they lack 
binding effect. See Peerenboom, supra note 108, at 236. This is a good thing from the per-
spective ofWfO transparency since normative documents are not subject to the publication 
requirements of the Litigation Law. See supra notes 159-60 (discussing Litigation Law). 
Although, formally, normative documents may not carry weight under the ALL, 
judges are likely to continue to consult them as a practical matter. See Biddulph, supra note 
112, at 65 ("such a well-entrenched mechanism for the internal management of decision-
making cannot be abolished overnight"); Peerenboom, supm note 108, at 236-37 (com-
menting that in practice, courts may continue to give weight to normative documents, 
particularly if there is no other legislation on point). In a recent survey of 280 Chinese 
judges, only 12.5% of those questioned stated that they would "never refer to" unpub-
lished, normative documents when considering a case. Corne, supra note 151, at 417. 
164 See Peerenboom, supra note 108, at 234. Professor Peerenboom reports that the 
overall success rate for Chinese plaintiffs under the ALL is forty percent, which is 
significantly higher than in the United States. ld. 
165 See id. at 234. While still "amazingly few" relative to the total, the number of specific 
administrative acts that were challenged under the ALL increased by 48% between 1995-
96, and again by 13% between 1996-97. Id. at 224. In contrast, the number of 
administrative acts that were referred to administrative reconsideration decreased each 
year between 1991 and 1996. Id. at 232; see also Corne, supra note 151, at 432-34 
(analyzing the relative advantages and disadvantages of administrative reconsideration 
versus judicial review under the ALL and applying each method to hypothetical scenarios). 
358 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:319 
ing WfO-related law, uniformly administering such law, and reviewing 
administrative decisions that implement such law. While in some re-
spects China's legal framework may fall short of the obligations set 
forth in the protocol, in general, China has laws in place that comport 
with the protocol's basic obligations. Of course, there is often a gap 
between creating laws and institutions on the one hand and imple-
menting and enforcing the law on the other. 
Notwithstanding the progress that has been achieved by the Chi-
nese government with institutional reform, there remain a number of 
institutional factors that weaken the judiciary and impede judicial inde-
pendence in China. The factors that undermine the neutrality of Chi-
nese judges include: political influence and the continued involvement 
of CCP,166 the lower status of judges vis-a-vis administrators,167 financial 
interests in court decisions at the local level (i.e., the interconnectedness 
oflocal government and the private sector),168 the funding of courts at 
the local level and the resulting dependence of judges on local govern-
ment, 169 the pull of personal connections (guanxt), 17o and outright cor-
ruption.171 More generally, the weakening authority of the CCP, along 
with the growing importance of wealth as a measure of success, has left a 
moral vacuum, which exacerbates conditions that promote corruption 
166 Peerenboom, supra note 108, at 215; see CHINA's LEGAL REFORMS, supra note 108, at 
26. 
167 Potter, supra note 108, at 30; Biddulph, supra note 112, at 80, 83. 
168 See LuBMAN, supra note 108, at 264-65; see also Corne, supra note 151, at 434 (ob-
serving that "where government interests are potentially at stake, courts often are little 
more than agents of the local people's government to which the relevant court is associ-
ated"). 
169 LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 265; Peerenboom, supra note 108, at 214-15. This 
manifests itself, for example, in judges tending to dismiss a case on overly narrow technical 
grounds in order to avoid issuing a ruling against a local entity with strong government 
backing. See Biddulph, supm note 112, at 83; Peerenboom, supra note 108, at 216-17. 
170 There has been much written on the Chinese tendency to value personal relation-
ships and the tension between such cultural values and Western notions of legality. See, e.g., 
LuBMAN, supra note 108, at 17, 19-21, 24-25; PomR, supra note 108, at 12-13, 30-31. 
171 One of the unfortunate byproducts of China's rapid move to a market is increased 
corruption. As Professor Luhman puts it, the reforms have "created many institutional 
settings in which government officials can use their power to affect economic outcomes," 
which in turn creates the expectation for bribes. LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 120. The gov-
ernment has made corruption in the judiciary a high-profile issue. See Dian Tai, judges Told 
to Improve in Quality, CHINA DAILY, July 6, 2002, at 2 (reporting a government crackdown 
against Chinese judges that abuse their powers for personal gain). 
For a discussion of the problem of corruption in China's legal system, see, for exam-
ple, LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 120-21; PANITCHPAKDI & CLIFFORD, supra note 60, at 160 
(observing that "all too often, there is an unhealthy symbiotic relationship between busi-
nesses and government officials"); PomR, supra note 108, at 31; Peerenboom, supra note 
108, at 227 n.369. 
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and complicates efforts to promote neutral and objective decision-
making.172 Widespread corruption of public officials in China not only 
impedes effective lawmaking, but also has incited violence among disaf-
fected groups in ChinaP3 Minxin Pei describes corruption as a "grow-
ing cancer" on China's political system.174 These factors will operate to 
prevent effective implementation of China's transparency-related obli-
gations, particularly the requirement to allow judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions. 
Since these impediments to judicial independence are rooted in 
social and political conditions in China, making progress in these ar-
eas can only be achieved over time. Yet China is certainly not the only 
WTO member that faces institutional barriers to promoting transpar-
ency. What is unique about China as a WTO member is the degree to 
which the existence of "rule of law" in China became part of the ac-
cession debate. The transparency-related commitments outlined 
above may provide leverage to the CCP in furthering certain aspects 
of legal reform, such as promoting judicial competence and eliminat-
ing corruption throughout the country. 
The judicial institution that has played the most active role in 
promoting judicial competence and independence in China is the 
Supreme People's Court (SPC). The SPC has been described as the 
"most important and active interpretation authority in China."175 In 
contrast with the U.S. Supreme Court, the SPC functions both as a 
tribunal and as supervisor of China's judicial systemP6 Institutional 
172 See LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 119-21; Peerenboom, supra note 108, at 225-27. 
173 See Erik Eckholm, Corruption Pmtest in China Leads to Charges, Top and Bottom, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, at A5 (providing one recent example where, in March 2002, tens of 
thousands of demonstrators took to the streets to protest pervasive corruption among 
government officials in Liaoning Province). 
174 MINXIN PEI, FUTURE SHOCK: THE Wf0 AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHINA 5 
(Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Pol'y Brief Vol. 1, No. 3, 2001) [hereinafter PEI, 
FuTURE SHOCK]. He estimates the aggregate cost of corruption at four to eight percent of 
China's GDP and argues that, if allowed to continue unchecked, corruption ultimately 
may lead to the occurrence of an Indonesian-style collapse of government in China. ld. 
The NPC is considering proposed legislation that could curb one source of corruption 
among Chinese bureaucrats. The law would strictly limit the right of administrative depart-
ments to decide which activities need administrative licenses. The law would limit this rule-
making authority to the highest levels of government-the NPC, the NPC Standing Commit-
tee, and the State Council. See Meng Yan, Admin License Under Scrutiny, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 29, 
2002, at 2. This draft law is also discussed in Peerenboom, supra note 108, at 248. 
175 CHEN, supra note 7, at 108. 
176 See Susan Finder, The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China, 7 J. CHI-
NESE L. 145, 145 (1993). 
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and economic reform has transformed the SPC since its re-emergence 
after the Cultural Revolution.l77 
In an effort to provide guidance to the courts and to bring some 
degree of coherence to the law, the SPC issues official opinions and 
interpretations of Chinese legislation in the official gazette of the 
SPC.l78 Since 1985, the SPC has also published its decisions, or se-
lected and revised versions of lower court decisions, in order to edu-
cate and provide guidance to the courts, thus enabling the judicial 
system to handle more complex cases.l79 The SPC has also worked to 
improve the level of professionalism in the judiciary-for example, by 
in traducing a reform package in July 2002 to enhance the 
qualifications of the judiciary. ISO 
Significantly, the SPC has emphasized China's WfO transpar-
ency-related obligations as a means to promote judicial independence 
in cases affecting international trade. In August 2002, the SPC issued 
what the CCP's English language newspaper called a "landmark" 
regulation.lSl The SPC's Trade Regulationl82 establishes the supervi-
177 !d. at 147. 
178 LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 283. For example, the SPC recendy issued an interpre-
tation that should enhance transparency in proceedings under the ALL. See Meng Yan, 
Evidence Move Aims to Help Individuals, CHINA DAILY, July 26, 2002, at 1. The interpretation 
requires that, in litigation challenging administrative decisions, the administrative body 
defending the decision must disclose all evidence and documents utilized in making a 
decision. !d. According to SPC Justice Li Guoguang, this was the first "systematic" judicial 
interpretation concerning evidentiary rules in administrative litigation cases. !d. 
179 See LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 284-85. The editor of the SPC Gazette, Liang Huix-
ing, publicly commented on the significance of the SPC's publication of judicial decisions, 
particularly in the context of China's civil law system. See id. at 285. Professor Luhman de-
scribes Liang Huixing's remarks: 
Chinese law ... was undergoing the same kind of evolution that the civil law 
systems of Europe had experienced. As European society became more com-
plex ... judges began to create "important legal principles ... despite the fact 
that the civil law system still did not admit the validity of precedent." The 
[SPC], by deciding to publish decisions in the Gazette, "has moved [China's] 
legal system from nineteenth-century traditional legal theory into modern le-
gal theory." 
!d. at 285 (quoting Liang Huixing, Minfa de faz.han yu minfa de fangfalun [The Development 
and Methodology of Civil Law], Lecture at the Fourth Meeting of Correspondents of the 
Supreme People's Court Gazette (1995), at 3). The comparison with the European legal 
system suggests that the SPC is seeking to introduce Western notions of judicial review, 
albeit in a civil law context. See id. 
ISO See Shao, supra note 120, at 1. 
181 FuJing, New Role for Legal System in Trade, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 30, 2002, at 1. 
182 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Questions Concerning the 
Hearing and Handling of International Trade Administrative Cases (effective Oct. 1, 2002) 
(Judicial Interpretation, Supreme People's Court, P.R.C.) (Fa Shi [2002] No. 27), available 
2004] China's WTO Accession 361 
sory powers of China's courts, in accordance with the provisions of 
the ALL, to review administrative decisions relating to international 
trade and intellectual property.183 It allows parties, including foreign 
investors, to institute litigation in the courts to request judicial review 
of any "concrete" act of a government authority in connection with a 
WTO-related matter.184 The regulation specifies that, where more 
than one reasonable interpretation is applicable to a matter, the in-
terpretation that is consistent with China's international treaty obliga-
tions shall prevail.185 The vice-president of the SPC publicly stated that 
the purpose of the regulation is to "keep our domestic laws and regu-
lations consistent with WTO rules."186 While the Trade Regulation is 
particularly important, it is not the sole example of WTO obligations 
providing the impetus for legal reform. The government has also in-
voked China's WTO obligations in connection with a number of other 
reform-oriented measures.ts7 
The SPC's authority to promote judicial independence is circum-
scribed both by the supremacy of the CCP188 and by specific statutory 
limitations on its authority to interpret law.1B9 Thus, it is important to 
at http:/ /www.isinolaw.com (Isinolaw Reference ID: JI-0-15626-0-360) [hereinafter 
Trade Regulation]. 
18!1 Id. The scope of the Trade Regulation encompasses any administrative case con-
cerning international trade, including specifically: (i) trade of goods; (ii) trade in services; 
and (iii) protection of intellectual property rights. Id. 
184 Id. art. 3. Thus the Regulation does not confer authority on the courts to review the 
rulemaking authority of Chinese administrative authorities. I d. The Trade Regulation also 
clarifies the aspects of judicial review that a court is authorized to undertake. Id. art. 6. 
Specifically, the court may consider: the truth and sufficiency of the evidence, the accuracy 
of the law applied, the legality of the procedure followed, whether the agency acted within 
its authority, whether there was an abuse of authority, whether the penalties applied were 
"patently unjust," and the existence of any refusals or delay in performing the agency's 
statutory duties. Id. 
185 Trade Regulation, supra note 182, art. 9. 
186 Fu Jing, New Role for Legal System in Trade, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 30, 2002, at 1. 
187 See generally Meng Yan, Evidence Move Aims to Help Individuals, CHINA DAILY, July 26, 
2002, at 1 (observing that the judicial provisions of the SPC regarding evidence in admin-
istrative cases "reflect the requirements of the World Trade Organization"); Dian Tai, 
Judges Told to Improve Quality, CHINA DAILY, July 6-7, 2002, at 2 (describing government 
efforts to reduce corruption in the judiciary, the "new challenge" of dealing with increas-
ing numbers of foreign litigants in light of China's entry to the WTO); sources cited in 
supra note 146 (government quotations on WTO transparency). 
188 See LuBMAN, supra note 108, at 139 (discussing the "supreme authority" of the CCP 
in China, citing the 1982 Constitution). The Preamble to China's Constitution refers to 
the so<alled "Four Fundamental Principles," one of which is upholding the leadership of 
the CCP. See CHEN, supra note 7, at 70 (citing the 1982 Constitution). 
189 See LUBMAN, supra note 108, at 145, 283. Under Chinese law, the sole source of legal 
rules is legislation. Id. at 145. As a formal matter, the power of the SPC to interpret Iegisla-
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recognize the political constraints in order to understand the extent 
to which legal reform is feasible. The American concept of "rule of 
law" encompasses not only transparency but also judicial independ-
ence and the notion that no person, including a government official, 
is above the law.190 China's leadership has expressed a commitment to 
promoting judicial independence in a narrow sense of the phrase-
that is, by ensuring that judges decide WTO-related cases (including 
review of administrative acts) on the basis of China's international 
obligations, as opposed to being influenced by guanxi, corruption, or 
political influence at the local level. However, it is unlikely that such 
change will involve any significant expansion of the courts' power vis-
a-vis the CCP or the administrative apparatus. WTO accession has and 
will continue to further legal reform by enhancing the professional-
ism of the courts and reducing local government influence. Notwith-
standing its limitations, China's success in this endeavor would repre-
sent a significant step forward. 
The title of Stanley Luhman's book on Chinese legal reform is 
Bird in a Cage: Legal &form in China After Mao. The metaphor of a bird 
in a cage expresses Professor Luhman's view of the status of legal re-
form in China today-unquestionably existing and evolving, yet con-
strained as if enclosed behind bars.191 This is reflected in the lack of 
independence of the judiciary and the continuing dominance of the 
CCP over policy-making. Of course, to the extent that the Party's pri-
orities and objectives include promoting transparency in economic 
decision-making, the CCP policy will not constrain legal reform. Thus, 
it can be expected that efforts to enhance the professionalism and 
competency of the judiciary in China will continue. What is less cer-
tain is whether the judiciary will play a meaningful role in correcting 
abuses of discretion or WTO-inconsistent rulemaking by the adminis-
trative branch. While it is still rather early to judge, anecdotal evi-
tion is limited to "the interpretation of problems of the concrete application of laws or 
regulations." Id. (citing the Organic Law of the People's Courts, art. 83). In practice, the 
SPC has been expansive in its interpretations of law, at times creating new rules or even 
contradicting NPC legislation. See id. at 283. 
190 See, e.g., Richard Fallon, "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1997) (listing the elements of rule of law in the United States on 
which there is some scholarly agreement, including the "supremacy of legal authority" over 
both officials and citizens, and the existence of a fair and impartial court system to enforce 
the law). 
191 LuBMAN, supra note 108, at 297. The metaphor was first used during the early days 
of reform, when a senior Chinese economist suggested that the private sector of the econ-
omy be kept like a "bird in a cage." Id. 
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dence suggests that WTO accession has already influenced some Chi-
nese judges towards greater professionalism and neutrality, at least 
with respect to trade-related matters.l92 
III. PoTENTIAL FOR FuTURE PoLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA 
As stated in the Introduction, China is at a turning point. While 
China has undergone dramatic economic and even legal changes in 
the process of joining the WTO, the CCP has endeavored to maintain 
rigid control over other spheres of Chinese society. While it is impos-
sible to predict the future path of political reform in China, there are 
some encouraging signs that China's integration with the world mar-
ket might, over time, lead to political and social liberalization as well. 
It is worth noting that China has already undergone extensive 
political reform over the past two decades. As with the discussion of 
legal change,l93 whether China has achieved political reform depends 
on the viewpoint one takes. China's political leadership either could 
be described as repressive and undemocratic (compared to Western 
norms) or much improved (compared to the Maoist era).194 However, 
China is unlikely to undergo a perestroika-style political reform any 
time in the near future. 195 In contrast with Deng Xiaoping's era of 
market reform, where benefits were immediately realized and the 
192 See Zhang Yong, New Court System to Handle Foreign Cases, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 5, 2002, 
(quoting LiKe, president of the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People's Court) (on file with 
author). According to the China Daily, a special team of judges in Beijing has been desig-
nated to handle cases involving international business and trade. !d. The special bench, 
which was set up to provide a "transparent, just and efficient" forum to resolve interna-
tional cases, plans on sending judges abroad to gain legal experience. Anecdotal e>idence 
also suggests that courts in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou are increasingly 
willing to rule in favor of foreign parties. See Beijing Eyes Fairer Legal, Tax Systems, NIKKEI 
WEEKLY, Sept. 9, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei File. 
193 See supm Part II. 
194 See, e.g., Pei, Is China Democmtizing1, supra note 114, at 68-69 (observing that in 
1978, when Deng Xiaoping first took power, the Chinese political system that he inherited 
"resembled a Hobbesian world," with a seriously weakened bureaucracy, nonexistent legal 
system, and complete lack of institutions of political participation). Pei argues that, in 
addition to economic reform, China's leadership under Deng has allowed limited institu-
tional changes that could have a dramatic impact in the future on the division of power in 
China-in particular, strengthening the NPC and making extensive reforms to the legal 
system. !d. at 75-77. 
195 See Full Text of Jiang's Speech at CPC Anniversary Gathering, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, 
July 1, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, Zinhua File (urging China to "resist the im-
pact of Western political models such as the multi-party system or separation of powers 
among the executive, legislative and judicial branches"). Thus, CCP pronouncements con-
tinue to reject Western political models even as the Party pursues economic reform. !d. 
364 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:319 
more difficult aspects of economic reform were delayed, WTO acces-
sion presents a more difficult stage for China. As a result, the Chinese 
leadership will continue to use repression as a way to stifle social dis-
content and will be very wary of loosening its grip on power.196 At the 
same time, the government recognizes the need to build political in-
stitutions sufficient to support a market economy and to that end is 
introducing limited changes, such as the legal reforms described in 
the previous section. In addition, market liberalization has weakened 
the CCP's ability to control all aspects of the peoples' lives. 
One such limited political change is the government's tolerance of 
democratic-style elections in parts of China's rural provinces. The ex-
ample of Buyun Township, a poor, agricultural region in Sichuan prov-
ince, was described in The Economist's recent survey of China.197 Several 
years ago, Buyun conducted direct elections for the position of town-
ship chief without seeking permission from the central government.198 
In 2001, apparently to discourage other townships from following Bu-
yun's example, the CCP issued an order that the usual method of elec-
tion be followed. However, Buyun township officials interpreted the 
wording of the order "creatively" and conducted competitive elections 
for a single candidate. In this manner, almost one-third of Sichuan's 
townships allowed the public to elect candidates.l99 Such limited ex-
periments in democratic elections may be the result of encouragement 
from certain reform-minded leaders in the CCP,2°0 but it is also a func-
tion of the Party's lack of control in the countryside. 2o1 
Another factor that has undermined the Party's ability to control 
the public is the widespread availability of information over the Inter-
net. Since the mid-1990s, when the Internet was introduced to China, 
196 See PEI, FuTURE SHOCK, supra note 174, at 4-5. 
197 Seeds of Change~. THE EcoNOMIST, june 15, 2002. 
198 !d. Normally, an "indirect" election method is utilized, whereby the only candidate 
elected by the township people's congress is the one chosen by the Party. Id. 
199 !d. The elected candidates were then submitted to the township people's congress 
for approval. !d. 
2oo See infra note 218 (discussing The Fourth Generation and noting that powerful CCP 
officials who have been said to advocate experimenting with limited political reforms in-
clude Li Ruihuan, recently retired chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference; and Zeng Qinghong, recently elected Vice President and head of the CCP 
Secretariat). 
2°1 See Pei, Is China Democratizingr, supra note 114, at 80. The decline of the Party's con-
trol in rural parts of China dates back to the early years of reform, when Deng Xiaoping 
dismantled the collective farms. As market reform has progressed, and constraints on 
movement of people have been lifted, most young, capable CCP members have left the 
villages for better jobs in the cities. I d. 
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the CCP has attempted to implement controls to prevent the public's 
access to politically sensitive information. A recent example of this is 
the government's blocking of Chinese Internet users' access to the 
Google and AltaVista search engines.202 In preparation for the Six-
teeenth CCP Congress in November 2002 (when Jiang Zemin stepped 
down as CCP General Secretary), the CCP cracked down on access to 
Internet material that was openly critical of the regime.2°3 However, as 
former President Clinton once observed, trying to control the Internet 
is like "trying to nail Jell-0 to the wall. "204 There are other ways to ac-
cess search engines like Google, such as by entering a numerical ad-
dress.205 Even while imposing controls, the CCP at the same time en-
courages Internet use and has even allowed foreign participation in the 
telecommunications industry as a means of modernizing the econ-
omy.206 Thus, attempts by the CCP to control the Internet may ulti-
mately prove to be elusive. In fact, the CCP has enough difficulty con-
straining its own press, which increasingly is following the dictates of 
the market rather than government directives.207 
Finally, as people enjoy increased wealth and personal liberty as a 
result of market reform, a number of diverse groups in Chinese soci-
ety are creating formal and informal organizations to promote their 
interests. These groups have increased in number and activity level as 
202 Joseph Kahn, China Toughens Obstacles to Internet Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2002, 
at A3 (describing how, in September 2002, Chinese Internet users attempting to access 
Google's search engine were routed either to the Chinese search engine GlobePage, or to 
Shanghai Hotline, a webpage run by China Telecom). 
203 E.g., Falun Dafa Clearwisdom.net, Exposing the Crimes of Jiang Zemin, at 
http:/ /www.clearwisdom.net/emh/special_column/expoevil.html (last 'visited Sept. 22, 
2002). Google is of particular interest to Chinese Internet users, as it allows for searches 
using simplified Chinese characters. But Google, unlike other search engine companies 
such as Yahoo!, does not have a physical presence in China and therefore has not agreed 
to government controls limiting users' access to information. See Kahn, China Toughens 
Obstacles, supra note 202. 
2°4 Clinton's Words on China: Trade is the Smart Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at A10. 
205 Stop Your Searching, THE EcoNOMIST, Sept. 7, 2002, at 42. 
206 See Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 34, at 17 (allowing foreign sup-
pliers of telecommunications services, including on-line information and database re-
trieval services, to establish joint venture enterprises in China). 
2°7 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Beijing in a Rear-Ground Battle Against a Newly Spirited Press, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, at Al. A notable example is Caijing, a business magazine that 
has published articles that are critical of state-owned banks and politically favored compa-
nies. !d. Although the propaganda arm of the Party works to control the activity of the 
press, observers describe the effort as a "futile battle," due to the gro\\ing size and diversity 
of China's media. !d. 
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the Party's ability to control the population has waned.2°8 While many 
of China's non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were initially es-
tablished by the state,2°9 others have evolved in a grassroots fashion 
through the activity of dedicated individuals.210 A look at several ex-
amples illustrates the impressive degree to which the initiative and 
creativity of individuals has been channeled into social causes, not-
withstanding the constraints imposed by the CCP. 
1. Maple Women's Psychological Counseling Centre: a center that has 
been conducting policy research and providing counseling services 
for women in Beijing since 1988. It established a women's telephone 
hotline and provides legal information through a telephone service. 
With the support of the Ford Foundation, it established an "Ark Fam-
ily Centre" for single parents and their children.211 
2. ''Friend" Exchange: a magazine based in Qingdao with a circula-
tion of 8000 whose purpose is to promote the physical and mental 
well-being of gays and lesbians. The magazine focuses on HIV I AIDS 
and STD awareness and education.212 
3. Volunteer Mothers' Association for Environmental Protection: an asso-
ciation based in Xi'an that organizes volunteer activities, education, 
and training to promote environmental awareness and public participa-
tion in environmental protection. It began a "Hand in Hand" school-
20s George Gilboy & Eric Heginbotham, China's Coming Transformation, FoREIGN AFF., 
July-Aug. 2001, available at, LEXIS, News Library, Forafr File. China Development Brief, an 
online research service in China, recently published 250 CHINESE NGOs: CIVIL SociETY IN 
TilE MAKING, supra note 2. The special report describes 250 national and local non-
governmental organizations currently operating in China, including information regard-
ing Chinese NGOs' history, scope, and future projects. To order the special report or to 
read updates on the continuing growth of NGO activity in China, see http:/ /www.chi-
nadevelopmentbrief.com/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2004). 
209 See Nick Young, Searching for Civil Society, in 250 CHINESE NGOs, supra note 2, at 13. 
Since the early days of Mao Zedong's rule, the Chinese government and the CCP set up 
organizations (referred to as government organized NGOs, or GONGOs), initially as an 
instrument for disseminating CCP policy, and later on to pursue research, policy, or chari-
table endeavors. See id. Examples of GONGOs include the All-China Youth Federation and 
the China Disabled Persons Federation. Id. For a description of various legal activities con-
ducted by NGOs affiliated with Chinese universities, research centers, and bar associations, 
see C. David Lee, Legal Reform in China: A Role for Nongovernmental Organizations, 25 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 363, 382-413 (2000). 
210 SeeYoung, supra note 209, at 16 (observing that, in addition to GONGOs, "growing 
numbers" of activists have established NGOs in China, notwithstanding government re-
strictions, through the dedication of key individuals). 
211 Id. at 101. 
212 Id. at 226. 
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based environmental education campaign involving over 120 elemen-
tary schools and has organized environmental awareness workshops.m 
The Chinese government, wary of the potential of social groups to 
promote instability and discontent, has severely limited the ability of 
NGOs to operate, diversifY, or otherwise expand their activity.214 None-
theless, official attitudes towards these groups have begun to soften in 
light of the many contributions that they provide.215 The government 
thus has had an awkward time dealing with NGOs because, while some 
NGOs may be viewed by the CCP as fulfilling a valuable function, the 
CCP nonetheless imposes rigid constraints on their activities. 
In addition to organized social activity, there is a range of infor-
mal social activity conducted by "dissatisfied" groups, including farm-
ers, the unemployed, consumers, industry associations, labor unions, 
religious movements, special-interest groups, and separatists.216 Even-
tually, the CCP may need to liberalize constraints on social organiza-
tions as a "safety valve" to relieve the pressure created by such discon-
tent.217 Some China observers have argued that the new generation of 
China's leaders is likely to introduce modest political reform in China 
by legitimizing the activity of these organizations and allowing greater 
input by citizen groups in policy-making.218 In any event, while the 
mId. at 222. 
214 See, e.g., Regulations for Registration and Management of Social Organizations 
(1998) (P.R.C. State Council Order No. 250) (published in People's Daily, Apr. 11, 1998), 
translated in 250 CHINESE NGOs, supra note 2, at 290 [hereinafter State Council Order No. 
250]. Consider, for example, Article 4 of State Council Order No. 250, which establishes 
regulations governing the operation of social organizations: 
Social organizations must observe the constitution, state laws, regulations, 
and state policy; must not oppose the basic principles of the constitution, 
harm the unity, security or ethnic harmony of the state, or interests of the 
state and society, or the lawful interests of other organizations or citizens, or 
offend social morality. 
State Council Order No. 250, supra, art. 4. In addition, government regulations require 
that NGOs be sponsored by the government or the CCP, severely limit the number of or-
ganizations that may operate at a given level, and require that organizations only operate 
within the geographic area where registered. 250 CHINESE NGOs, supra note 2, at 14. At 
the same time, the government recognizes the value and many contributions of these or-
ganizations. Id. at 16. 
215 See Young, supra note 209, at 16 n.11 (citing a number of China Daily articles that 
praise the activities of the Maple Women's Counseling Centre). 
216 Gilboy & Heginbotham, supra note 208. 
217 See Young, supra note 209, at 15 ("It may be that, precisely in order to assure social 
stability and cohesion, the Party will have to loosen social controls."). 
21s Gilboy & Heginbotham, supra note 208. But see PEI, FuTURE SHOCK, supra note 174, 
at 5. Dr. Pei believes that, "however appealing," a political approach of including popular 
participation by organized social interests is unlikely to be adopted by the Party. Instead, 
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CCP continues to crack down on dissident speech and other forms of 
public protest, the scope of permissible expression in China is much 
broader than it was in the past.219 
What role has the wro played in this process? While it has not 
played a direct role, WfO membership affects China indirectly in 
ways that will further undermine the CCP's ability to control society. 
In March 2000, former President Clinton explained how WfO acces-
sion could accelerate a process of liberalization in China that has al-
ready been underway for some time: 
By lowering the barriers that protect state-owned industries, 
China is speeding a process that is removing government 
from vast areas of people's lives. In the past, virtually every 
Chinese citizen woke up in an apartment or a house owned 
by the government, went to work in a factory or a farm run 
by the government and read newspapers published by the 
government. State-run workplaces also operated the schools 
where they sent their children, the clinics where they re-
ceived health care, [and] the stores where they bought food. 
That system was a big source of the Communist Party's 
power. Now people are leaving those firms, and when China 
joins the W.T.O., they will leave them faster. The Chinese 
he predicts that China's leadership will most likely respond to the short-term adjustments 
resulting from wro accession with continued repression against political dissent and so-
cial unrest, pragmatism in economic matters, and "extremely cautious and incremental 
tinkering" with the political system to increase effectiveness. Id. 
Recendy leaked confidential reports compiled by the CCP suggest that supporters of 
such reform include one newly-appointed and one departing member of the all-powerful 
CCP Politburo Standing Committee: Li Ruihuan, who will be retiring from his number-four 
rank in the CCP, and Zeng Qinghong, Jiang Zemin's closest protege, recendy appointed 
Secretary of the CCP Secretariat and new Vice President. The reports suggest that these lead-
ers advocate limited competitive elections at the local level and a partially free media to im-
pose discipline on CCP officials and operate as a check on corruption and abuse of power. 
See id.; Andrew Nathan & Bruce Gilley, China's New Rulers: What They Want, N.Y. REv. BooKs, 
Oct. 10, 2002, at 28-30; see also Andrew Nathan & Bruce Gilley, China's New Rulers: 1. The Path 
to Power, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Sept. 26, 2002, at 12. These two articles present the main findings 
of a book that was written by a CCP insider (under pseudonym). See ZoNG HAIREN, DISIDAI 
[THE FouRTH GENERATION] (2002); see also Who's in Charge Now1 THE EcoNOMIST, Nov. 23, 
2002, at 41 (obsening that Zeng Qinghong has increasingly spoken up on the need for lim-
ited political reform as a check on the conduct of government officials). 
219 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Chinese Freer to Speak and Read, But Not Act, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
12, 2003, at A3 (describing how the CCP has grown increasingly tolerant of dissident 
speech that in the past was grounds for exile or imprisonment). 
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government no longer will be everyone's employer, land-
lord, shopkeeper and nanny all rolled into one.22o 
369 
The developments described in the previous paragraphs suggest 
that President Clinton's predictions are being realized. What remains 
to be seen is whether the weakening of government control and eco-
nomic dislocation, resulting from economic reform, will ultimately 
produce mass unrest and further repression,22I or whether it will pro-
duce continued growth and gradual political liberalization. 
CoNcLUSION 
A Chinese government official from Jilin province recently shared 
an anecdote regarding his experience studying in the United States. He 
related how an American acquaintance he had met in Chicago asked 
him why he had come to the United States. When the Chinese official 
explained that he came to the United States "to learn more about the 
wro," he was very surprised to discover that the American did not 
know to what the acronym ''WfO" referred. He asked whether such 
ignorance of the WfO is typical in this country.222 At one level, this ex-
ample lends support to the stereotype of Americans' lack of awareness 
regarding world affairs. But on another level, it illustrates how much 
the WfO has figured into the consciousness of the Chinese.223 The 
CCP tends to issue propaganda that is favorable regarding the WfO 
while downplaying any negative effects. The government's message is 
22o Clinton's Words on China, supra note 204. 
221 An interesting precedent is Mexico's situation following the conclusion of NAFTA 
in 1990 (NAFTA entered into force in 1994). Like China when it acceded to the WTO, 
when joining the NAFTA, Mexico agreed to profound economic and legal changes to ac-
commodate the demands of Canada and the United States, including dismantling its tariff 
and nontariff barriers to trade, extending national treatment to Canadian and U.S. inves-
tors, and agreeing to investor-state arbitration of investment disputes. See GRUBER, supra 
note 55, at 146-49. The political situation in Mexico rapidly deteriorated during the sev-
eral-year period between the announcement and the effective date of NAFTA, which coin-
cided with the outbreak of a Zapatista-led insurgency in Chiapas. Id. at 151. The Chiapas 
insurgency was followed by the peso crisis in December 1994, triggered by the govern-
ment's decision to allow a fifty percent depreciation in the value of the peso. !d. at 149-51. 
222 In fact, I have had numerous conversations with Chinese visiting or studying in the 
United States who have expressed surprise at the lack of interest and/or knowledge of the 
wro among Americans. 
225 A search of the English-language website of the CCP official newspaper (the Peopk's 
Daily) for articles containing the term "WTO" pulled over two thousand stories. See 
http:/ /english.peopledaily.com.cn (last visited Mar. 12, 2003); see alw PANITCHPAKDI & CLIF-
FORD, supra note 60, at 32 (describing the WfQ as taking on an "almost mythic importance" 
in China). 
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that, while painful in the short term, wro membership will be 
beneficial for China in the long run. Over the coming years, China will 
be tested. It will be tested economically through painful adjustments 
resulting from China's exposure to the world market. It will also be 
tested politically, as the new generation of China's leaders decides 
whether and how to adapt the CCP's approach to governing an increas-
ingly independent, informed, and economically diverse population. 
